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Abstract
The increase in wealth-to-income ratios in the second half of XXth century has recently received
much attention. We decompose the trend in physical capital and housing, further decomposed
into structures and land. In four out of five major countries analyzed, the positive trend in
capital-income ratio arises from housing and specifically from its land component.
We therefore revisit the question of wealth inequality and taxation in adopting a Georgist
perspective (from Henry George, 1879) subsequently endorsed by prominent economists. We
introduce land and housing structures in Judd’s optimal taxation framework. We show that an
optimal taxation implies a property tax on land and no tax on capital.
When the range of property taxes is politically constrained, taxing the product of housing
rents is not optimal, even with additional taxes on "imputed rents". Rent taxes are however less
distortive than a capital tax. The distortion depends on the share of housing structures and how
they react to the tax on rents. However, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on structures
investments in rental housing units does almost as well as a land tax. As a side result, we find
that Judd’s result of no second best capital taxation extends to a larger range of parameters at
the steady-state.
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1 Introduction
In the recent years, a discussion arose around the trends in capital over income. In Capital in the
21st Century, Thomas Piketty carefully documents the strong secular rise of the capital/income ratio,
especially in France, but also provides evidence of a similar trend in other countries (Piketty, 2013,
2014). Starting from this finding, the author argues for a widespread policy of increased wealth and
capital taxation.
Our paper reconsiders the evolution of wealth and capital over the last decades and details the
relative evolution of physical capital vs. housing. Housing alone explains the rise of wealth relative to
income. The paper also details the relative evolution of housing structures vs land: the latter explains
the rise of housing wealth relative to physical capital. The paper then investigates the normative
implications of these trends. It brings back land, a long forgotten factor in modern public economics,
to the heart of the theory, adopting the so-called Georgist view. Henry George’s manifesto (George,
1879) Progress and Poverty argued within "the single tax movement" that a tax on land rent would
allow to redistribute the return of the common heritage to benefit all individuals.
We extend a Judd-type model of capitalist and workers, a well-suited framework to study redis-
tributive capital taxation, in introducing land, housing structures, housing consumption and housing
rental market. In this setup, we show that it is enough to tax land. This is an old idea, revived
here to understand in which cases and at which level land taxes can be achieved. When land can
indeed be taxed, taxing productive capital would be almost useless. The upshot is that a wealth tax
taxing uniformly all three kinds of wealth, land, structures and capital at the same rate is not recom-
mended. The convergence to an optimal zero-tax rate on capital is fully consistent with the seminal
Chamley-Judd result, see Judd (1985); Chamley (1986), and we explore its range of applicabilty.
Accounting for fixity of land and the consumption of its service by households, we quantify the
positive rate for the property tax of land to reach the social planner’s objective. The tax rate has to
be set so as to reduce the inequalities of income, consumption and welfare between capitalists and
workers-tenants. This tax will allow to compensate the wage-earners for the fact that they have no
property right on capital and land. A uniform tax on capital would instead be misleading as it does
not take into account the heterogeneity of capital.
A tax on the returns to housing capital (housing rents) can be implemented in the first best, but
not alone. In the absence of tax on land, the rent tax distorts the allocation of land across types of
agents through a classical tax-wedge effect; adding a tax on imputed rents (taxing owners-occupyers
and landlords) corrects for this distorsion, but still affects investments in residential structures which
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is then sub-optimal. A tax on rent therefore requires the addition of i) a tax on land differentiated
across the use of land - less on rental land and more on home-occupied land, and ii) further, requires
a specific subsidy on investments on rented structures. In the absence of this specific combination of
tax/subsidies structures, the first best cannot be achieved1.
However, a land tax, whether homogeneous or differentiated, may not be available at any level.
This may be due to the fact that not all countries have a land register (as in most developing
countries); or because the first best property tax rate is not attainable because there is a cap on
property tax rate (as in California); or finally because it is not possible for political reasons to tax
implicit (imputed) rents. We therefore compare a set of second-best tax arrangements and confirm
that taxation of capital is the most distortive.
We then explore the second best Ramsey logic where the social planner acts under the rationality
constraints of agents, in the spirit of Judd (1985), Benhabib and Szőke (2019), Lansing (1999),
Straub and Werning (2014, 2018), when a land tax is not available. We first qualify Judd’s result
of no taxation of productive capital in the limit, following the vein of Straub and Werning (2018).
We then show the conditions under which this negative Judd result remains valid when a rent tax is
available. We show that a rent tax (excluding imputed rents) may be second best optimal when the
tax revenue is redistributed to tenants. We provide the optimal rent tax formula given by an inverse
elasticity rule à la Ramsey. The optimal rate is decreasing in the supply elasticity of rental housing
by landowners. The distortion introduced by a rent tax is lower than the distortion introduced by a
capital tax and we offer an interpretation of this result thanks to the results obtained by Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971a) in a static framework. Finally, the existence of a fixed factor, land, extends the
range of parameters under which a steady-state with no capital tax is socially desirable.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the evolution of the capital labor ratio, its
components and its measurement. Section 3 introduces the optimal taxation framework in a model
of workers and capitalists à la Judd augmented with housing (land and structure). Section 4 provides
welfare analysis in the first best and in various second best exercises, and numerical results add up
to our understanding. Section 5 develops a literature review and concluding comments are gathered
in Section 6.
1This set of instruments provides an illustration of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) analysis.
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2 Wealth: measurement and decomposition
2.1 Trends in aggregate wealth
Figure 1 represents the historical evolution of wealth to income ratios in five countries, using Piketty’s
decomposition into housing, agricultural land, net foreign assets and other domestic asset2. It appears
that housing became, in the XXth century, a major component of wealth and explains most of the
upwards trends in France and the UK. This can be seen in inspecting the evolution of all series below
the black area, which represent all but housing (agricultural land, net foreign assets and other capital).
These wealth-to-income ratios would drop if one excluded housing wealth. This is in particular due
to the decline in agricultural rent in France as shown in panel a) in Figure 1. In the UK, Canada
and Germany (panels b) to d)), excluding housing similarly leads to very small secular increases in
wealth-to-income ratios or to stable evolutions. In the absence of housing, instead of a U-curve, one
would be observed a L-curve with a flat level of capital in the second half of the XXth century. In the
US (panel e), the wealth to income ratio net of housing wealth was the same in 1770 as it was in 2010,
and there is neither a long run trend nor a recent increase of this ratio. We do not however claim
that housing should be excluded from the analysis of wealth to income ratios, but rather than the
implication for taxation should take into account that housing structures and land are the primary
drivers of the recent trends in wealth accumulation. It is also important to note that Piketty and
Zucman (2014) not only acknowledged the role of housing, but also decompose the effects of prices
versus real quantities in the development of K/Y .
2In the data in Figure 1, the measurement of housing wealth is the sum of two elements, structures and developed
land with constructs, and Appendix A describes the main method as well as a comparison with alternative methods
used in national accounts.
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(a) France (b) United Kingdom
(c) Canada (d) Germany
(e) United States (f) Share of land in housing, all countries.
Figure’s notes. Sources panels a) to e): Capital in the 21st Century, Figures 4.6 & Chart 3.2- see piketty.pse.ens.
fr/capital21c and author’s calculation. In Canada, net foreign assets are negative, explaining the small part above
agricultural rent that is covered by housing wealth. Sources panel f): France, Canada and Germany: Piketty (http:
//piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capital21c). United States: Davis and Heathcote (2007) (https://www.lincolninst.edu/
subcenters/land-values/price-and-quantity.asp), last consultation November 2015. United Kingdom: Knoll et al.
(2017).
Figure 1: The role of land and housing in the secular variations in the wealth-to-income ratio. France, US, Canada,
UK and Germany.
2.2 Trends in the land component of wealth
A second observation derived from Figure 1 is the specific role of developed land in the trends.
Housing prices can be decomposed into a land component and construction costs (or alternatively
the price of “structures”). The land component is “almost” a fixed factor: it is not easily reproducible
or at least relatively inelastic in the short run due to geographical or legal barriers; while housing
structures are the outcome of current or past residential investments and are more elastic. Therefore,
before proceeding with a normative analysis, it is worth separating out the role of each respective
component of housing.
To the original Piketty series, we added a decomposition of housing into land and structures when
available, typically after the 1970’s. Following the methodology in Davis and Heathcote (2007), one
uses a perpetual inventory method similar to the one used to recover capital stocks. This decomposes
the evolution of each component (land and structure). It is further illustrated in panel f) which
presents the developed land leverage (the share of land in the value of housing wealth). In all countries,
the share of land in housing has been rising over the last 4 decades. Nowadays, it represents about
50% of the housing wealth in Canada, France and the UK. We can therefore conclude that occupied
land is the main factor responsible for the rise of housing wealth and therefore in the wealth-to-income
ratios. This is especially visible in the two countries where the wealth-to-income ratio increased most
since the 1950’s, France and the UK.
Our analysis rejoins that of other works on the overall trends of land. In particular, similar
conclusions on the importance of land price dynamics for a sample of 14 OECD countries were found
in Knoll et al. (2017). Most of the appreciation in housing prices comes from an appreciation of land
prices while construction costs only went through a moderate increase3.
Finally, the reasons behind the rise of residential land value are beyond the scope of this paper
and have been discussd convincingly in a growing stream of literature having notably documented the
large values of urban land (Albouy (2016); Albouy et al. (2018)) which might be partially explained
by land use regulation (Albouy and Ehrlich (2018); Glaeser et al. (2005)).
In conclusion of this empirical introduction, the main facts relevant for theory are: i) capital is
3We do not take a stance on the reasons for the increasing importance of land. It might be caused by the lack
of innovation in the transportation sector (Knoll et al., 2017), a concentration of individuals within the national
territory in major agglomerations, it could be financial shocks and innovations as in Garriga et al. (2019) who study
the decorrelation of US housing prices and rents due to financial shocks. It can finally be due to land regulation
interacting with growing housing demand. The causes of these dynamics are left for further research but our empirical
findings rejoin those of Knoll et al. (2017), Geerolf (2018), Grossmann and Steger (2016) and Borri and Reichlin (2016).
Finally, even if our focus is on the capital stock, it is worth noting that similar remarks can apply to trends in capital
income: Cette et al. (2019) recently emphasized that the decline in labor share could partially be explained by the rise
of real estate income.
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highly heterogeneous; ii) in particular, the recently observed rise in the capital to GDP ratio is mostly
due to a rise in housing (and not to an accumulation of the physical stock of capital and structures);
iii) land, a quasi-fixed asset plays an important role in these developments.
The next two Sections will therefore introduce developed land and investment in housing structures
to a standard model of physical capital and labor. It will be used to study differentiated taxation
of wealth, since taxing physical capital and land through a unique wealth tax could be sub-optimal
given the heterogeneity in capital and sources of wealth.
3 A model of optimal taxation with housing and physical capital
This Section develops a framework to understand the sharing of returns to wealth, productive capital
and land. Judd (1985)’s model is particularly well suited to discuss redistributive optimal taxation
of capital because its structure yields the highest incentives to tax capital for redistributive purposes:
i) there are agents with no savings - that is, no access to credit markets - and consuming only their
labor income and the possible transfers; and ii) there are agents with the ability to transfer wealth
across periods owning a combination of productive capital.
We start from Judd’s redistribution framework of a two-class economy with workers and capitalists
producing one composite good. We extend it with housing, as a combination of land and structure.
The agents with no access to savings market consume housing and therefore are both workers and
tenants. The agents with access to capital market own physical capital, invest and replace deprecia-
tion, own land, consume part of it for themselves and obtain rents from workers/tenants for the rest;
they also invest in structures.
The capitalists are the sole landlords of the economy; whereas workers are tenants4. The model
is thus a model of a representative working class with no assets and a representative capitalist class
holding all assets, land and physical capital, in the spirit of Judd (1985). We will consider throughout
this Section, for expositional reasons, the case where the mass of workers and capitalists are the same.
In Appendix C we discuss the extension to the general case of individual agents of different mass.
We start from the social planner’s program referred to as the best situation. Next, we look at
how a decentralized equilibrium with appropriate taxes reaches the first best of the social planner.
We then study the case in which the optimal tax structure cannot be implemented; we refer to this
situation as constrained social optimum. Finally, we discuss convergence issues along the way of
4This is a highly simplified, though a quite good representation of the actual world. It is true that housing property
is more widespread than financial asset, but land ownership is more concentrated: according to Wolff (2017), the
wealthiest 10% owned 82% of undeveloped land which is a buffer stock of developed land.
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Straub and Werning (2018) and extend some of their results to housing.
3.1 Setup
Time is discrete, indexed by t. Agents consume each period a representative consumption good and
a composite housing service. The housing service associates both land and housing structures. There
are two types of agents, a representative capitalist and a representative agent.
3.1.1 Capitalists
The class owing all assets is called generically capitalists. Following the traditional exposition and
notations, capitalists consume an amount Ct and a housing service denoted by Ht. The utility
function is
∑∞
t=0 β
tU(Ct, Ht) where 0 < β = (1 + ρ)−1 < 1 is a discount factor and we denote the
marginal utility as respectively UC(t) and UH(t) when inputs are at time t. The preferences for each
good are supposed to satisfy the Inada conditions, that is, the first units of consumption (respectively
housing service) have an infinite marginal utility for all consumption baskets. Inada conditions also
impose that the limit of marginal utility will go to 0 in infinity which will insure that transversality
conditions to be satisfied.
Capitalists own both a capital good Kt and the total quantity of land L¯, assumed to be fixed;
they also have the property of housing structures. Capitalists allocate part of land Lt to their own
consumption, and devote the rest to the rental housing sector, in quantity Lt − L¯. Capital is used
to produce a generic good with the mass of labor of size 1, thanks to a constant returns to scale
production technology denoted F (Kt, 1) = f(Kt). Capitalists inherit a stock of capital K0, which
depreciates at rate δ; they invest a quantity It so that
Kt+1 = Kt(1− δ) + It.
Following the traditional exposition and notations, capitalists consume an amount Ct. The pro-
duction of housing service is denoted by
Ht = H(Lt, St)
where St is the housing structure of the housing units consumed. This production of service follows
Lancaster (1966) and combines different inputs (land and structures) that enters into utility as a bun-
dle. This is similar to Becker’s home production theory, where in Becker (1965), this is a combination
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of time and resources. Unless specified, the function H(., .) will be assumed to be constant-returns
to scale and subject to Inada conditions. It means that camping (land but not structure) or piles of
bricks alone (structures but no land) provides no utility5.
We denote by H ′L(t) and H
′
S(t) the derivatives at time t of the marginal product of housing service
of each argument. St is another capital good and its law of motions is similar to that of investment
with depreciation rate δS :
St+1 = St(1− δS) + ISt
Similarly, they invest in the structures for rented units denoted by st and therefore:
st+1 = st(1− δs) + Ist
In what follows and to simplify exposition, we assume that δs = δS .
The produced good f(Kt) can be transformed into consumption Ct, ct or into new capital Kt+1,
into new structures St+1 or st+1 or into government consumption Gt. We assume for simplicity that
the marginal rate of transformation between these different components is 1.
3.1.2 Workers
The class generically called workers supplies its labor to the capitalist in fixed quantity and rents the
housing service ht from it. Their consumption is denoted by ct and the housing service is supplied
according to the production function similar to Ht, denoted ht with
ht = h(lt, s)
where lt = L¯ − Lt. As before, we denote by h′s(t) and h′l(t) the marginal product of each input.
Formally, h′L(t) = −h′l < 06. Finally, workers’ utility is the one period consumption of goods and
housing service, u(ct, ht).
5Our modelling of housing follows Muth (1969) and assumes a weakly separable utility function between the com-
posite commodity from one side and land and structure in the other side (see also the discussion in McDonald (1981).
This is in line with recent empirical evidence provided in Combes et al. (2017) and Epple et al. (2010) who find that
the housing production function is close to a Cobb Douglas.
6For this housing service st, as for that of the capitalist defined above, we will think of their production as a
constant returns to scale function with Inada conditions applying there too. This specification is sometimes used in
the macroeconomic literature. See for instance the recent paper by Garriga et al. (2019)
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3.2 Social planner’s program
3.2.1 Social planner’s objective
The social planner wants to maximize a weighted average of the utility of each agent, where the
weight of capitalists/landowners is given by 1 ≥ γ ≥ 0. A weight of zero implies that the social
planner only cares about those without property rights on land and capital (we will call this situation
Rawlsian). A weight equal to 1 is the utilitarian case. We will mostly consider intermediate cases
with 0 < γ < 1 with low values of γ, consistently with the literature. γ can also be interpreted as
the mass of capitalists relative to workers. We prove in Appendix that all subsequent results hold if
this mass is introduced in the objective functions of the social planner.
The social planner resource constraint is
f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− δS)(St + st) = ct + Ct + St+1 + st+1 +Kt+1 (1)
Hence, taxes affecting the decentralized equilibrium will be purely redistributive and have the
purpose of raising the consumption of goods and housing of the worker.
3.2.2 Social planner’s optimization
We assume that U(., .) and u(., .) are increasing concave in each argument. The budget constraint per
period of the social planner is concave as well as its objective function. The maximization problem
of the social planner can then be replaced by the following Lagrangian:
max
Ct,ct,St+1,st+1,Lt,Kt+1
∑
t
βt
{
u(ct, h(L¯ − Lt, st)) + γU(Ct, H(Lt, St))
}
+βtλt {f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt + (1− δS)(St + st)
−ct − Ct − St+1 − st+1 −Kt+1}
subject to three transversality conditions on each stock:
βtU ′C(t)Mt+1 → 0 (2)
for Mt+1 = Kt+1, St+1, st+1. In what follows, to avoid multiple indices, we add the time period when
relevant in parenthesis, e.g. RKgross(t+1) is the gross return to capital producing returns next period
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and defined as:
RKgross(t+ 1) = f ′(Kt+1) + 1− δ
We then obtain the first order conditions for each period:
∂Ct, ct λt = γU
′
C(t) = u
′
c(t) (3)
∂Lt γU ′HH ′L(t) = u′hh′l(t) (4)
∂St+1 λt = βλt+1(1− δS) + γβU ′HH ′S(t+ 1) (5)
∂st+1 λt = βλt+1(1− δS) + βu′hh′s(t+ 1) (6)
∂Kt+1 λt = βλt+1R
Kgross(t+ 1) (7)
This notably implies the following steady-state relations:
∂Ct, ct λ = γU
′
C = u
′
c (8)
∂Lt γU ′HH ′L = u′hh′l (9)
Euler St+1 β
−1 =
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
+ 1− δS (10)
Euler st+1 β
−1 =
u′hh
′
S
u′c
+ 1− δS (11)
Euler Kt+1 β
−1 = RKgross = f ′(K) + 1− δ (12)
The first two equalities are the result of intra-period optimization. The first one states that the
planner wants to equalize the marginal utilities of consumption across the two types of agents, up to
the social weight γ, and the second one has a similar interpretation in terms of the marginal utility
of the housing service with respect to land. They also imply that the marginal rate of substitution
between land as a producer of housing service and consumption are equal across agents: U
′
HH
′
L
U ′C
=
u′hh
′
l
u′c
,
that leads also to determine the ratio of marginal utilities across agents and fix it to γ:
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
=
u′c
U ′c
= γ (13)
In addition, there are three intertemporal first-order conditions, the Euler equations of the prob-
lem. The Euler equation on capital classically states that the net return on capital at the social
optimum has to be equal to the discount rate of agents. The earlier equations on structures have
similar interpretations: one invests on structure up to the point that the net return of structure given
by the marginal rate of substitution (U ′HH
′
S/U
′
C or u
′
hh
′
s/u
′
c) net of depreciation will be equal to the
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discount rate. It stems from these three Euler equations that the net rate of return in investing in
productive capital or in the two types of structures must be the same. Combining (10), (11) and (12),
one further gets that the marginal productivity of capital in the case when the depreciation rate is
the same for capital and structures and in the more general case, the result holds up to differences
in depreciation rates:
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
+ (1− δS) = u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
+ (1− δS) = f ′(K) + (1− δ) = β−1 (14)
The three equalities in equation (14) together with equation (13) and the resource constraint (1)
define five conditions for six endogenous variables: c, C,K, S, s,L. The conditions are independent of
the social weight γ. Hence, they define an efficient allocation set of dimension 1 and correspond to
what we hereafter refer to as the "first best". The particular solution chosen by the social planner
solution depends of γ and is fixed thanks to either equation (3) or( 4).
Finally, the marginal rate of transformation between space (land) and structures must be equal
across agents regardless of the weight given to the capitalist:
H ′S
H ′L
=
h′s
h′l
(15)
and combining equations (13) and (15), the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
structures are equalized across agents:
U ′C
U ′HH
′
S
=
u′c
u′hh′s
. (16)
3.3 The decentralized equilibrium with taxes
3.3.1 Setup
We discuss the distortions generated by several tax schemes. First, we investigate the simplest form
of capital taxation relying on a single tax on land τL¯ on productive capital τK owned by the capitalist.
In the welfare discussion, we also consider a tax on housing rents paid by landlords τH .
In next sub-sections, we also consider a tax on imputed rents for landlords living in their own
property (denoted by τHI), and finally turn to a living tax on the housing consumption of both
capitalists and workers (τliv). Finally, we discuss how these taxes might be combined with a tax or
a subsidy on housing investments, i.e on structures for capitalists (τS) or workers (τs). For conve-
nience and to avoid repetitions, all taxes are introduced simultaneously in Appendix B.3, and our
12
Propositions are simple cases of the general case but with start here with taxes on capital, rents and
land. Capitalists do not work, so their income is the sum of the net return on physical capital, net
rents and other taxes that may affect them, and they pay a market wage wt. Markets are perfectly
competitive, and we define the wage wt as usual as:
wt = f(Kt)− f ′(Kt)Kt (17)
The net, after-tax return on capital is
RKnett = (1− τK,t)RKgrosst (18)
where taxes on capital at time t are τK,t.
We also use the notation RHgrosst for the gross rent on land and τH,t for the tax rate of rents so
that RHnett = R
Hgross
t (1− τH,t) and capitalists therefore receive a rent income htRHnett .
In addition, we allow for taxes of land. The tax on land may differ for each type of land but for
the moment we introduce a unique tax is τL¯,t and the income from taxation of capitalist’s land is
TLt = τL¯,tL¯.
Let TKt = τK,tR
Kgross
t K be the tax revenue from capital, THt = τH,tR
Hgross
t ht the tax revenue
from rents. The sum of these components are the total taxes Tt that will be transferred to the worker,
with
Tt = T
K
t + T
H
t + T
L
t
3.3.2 Decentralized agents’ program
The objective of each agents (capitalist and workers) is concave as well as their resource constraints
so that we can directly proceed with their respective Lagrangians. The capitalist optimizes over an
infinite horizon, whereas the program of the worker is a static one, consuming the current disposable
income and transfers into consumption and housing services. In the absence of government bonds
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and thus other assets than housing and capital7, the capitalist solves:
max
Ct,Ht,Lt,Kt+1,st+1,St+1
∑
t
βtU(Ct, H(Lt, St))
+βtλKt
{
RKnett Kt +R
Hneth(L¯ − Lt, st)
+(1− δS)St + (1− δS)st − TLt
−Ct − St+1 − st+1 −Kt+1}
subject to subject to βtU ′C(t)Kt+1 → 0, and the program of the worker is:
max
ct,ht
u(ct, ht)
subject to ct + htR
Hgross
t = wt + Tt
In this program, the worker expresses a demand for both ht and ct. It cannot chose separately land
and structures. This specification of choices leads to the first order conditions:
Worker: intraperiod
∂ct u
′
c = λ
w
t u
′
h(t) (19)
∂ht u
′
h(t) = λ
w
t R
Hgross
t (t) (20)
⇔ u′h(t)= u′cRHgrosst (21)
Capitalist: intraperiod
∂Ct U
′
C(t) = λ
K
t (22)
∂Lt U ′HH ′L(t) = λKt RHneth′l(t) (23)
Capitalist: intertemporal (Euler)
∂St+1 λ
K
t (1 + τSt) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δS) + βU ′HH ′S(t+ 1) (24)
∂st+1 λ
K
t (1 + τst) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δS) + βλKt+1RHnett+1 h′s(t+ 1) (25)
∂Kt+1 λ
K
t = βλ
K
t+1R
Knet
t+1 (26)
The intra-period conditions state that the opportunity cost of getting more housing service is the
7One interesting way to rewrite the capitalist choice is to introduce wealth defined as At = Kt + (Ht + ht). In
this case the resource constraint is such that: Ct + At+1 − H¯ = RKgrosst (1 − τK,t)Kt + RHgrosst (1 − τH,t)(Ht + ht) −
HtR
Hgross
t (1−τH,t). If the net return on the two assets were identical, then the equation simplifies to Ct+At+1− H¯ =
RKnett At −HtRKnett . It has an interesting implication for our discussion because it precisely shows why housing is a
particular asset. Landowners have to sacrifice the rent corresponding to their own land use, the last term of the right
hand side of equality, otherwise absent from the standard asset accumulation equation when housing is not modeled.
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forgone utility of consumption RHgrosst u′c for the worker or RHnett U ′C for the capitalist with an extra
term for differential tax on the land allocated to housing service ht or Ht. In the steady-state and
after re-arrangement of the different terms detailed in Appendix, one obtains:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(1− τH) = u
′
c
U ′C
(27)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
(28)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
(29)
∂K β−1 = RKgross(1− τK) (30)
Anticipating the results of next Section, it appears, in comparing the decentralized equilibrium in
equations (10)-(12) and equation (16) with the social planner’s allocations reported above, that taxes
on physical capital will affect capital accumulation, while taxes on rent will both distort intra-period
allocation of consumption and residential investments, whereas land tax is not distortive. Moreover,
the land tax can even be differentiated across types of lands to alleviate the effect of other distortive
taxes. The next subsection will further elaborate on the welfare comparison of these taxes.
4 Welfare discussion
4.1 Achieving the social planner’s objective with a unique tax on land
To achieve the first best level of capital, the first order conditions of the decentralized equilibrium
must coincide with those of the social planner. Further, since there is a large number of welfare
solutions, the particular value of γ chosen leads to select the preferred first best solution of the social
planner. Collected taxes are used to redistribute income and achieve the desired level of relative
marginal utility for each agent.
As regards to capital, Euler equation (12) for the social planner is the target for the corresponding
decentralized equilibrium equation (30) and implies that τK = 0. A necessary condition to reach a
first best is therefore that the tax on capital is zero8.
8With a tax on investment τI,t similar to tax on structures and explored in Appendix, the dynamic Euler equation
on capital would become λKt (1 + τI,t+1) = βλKt+1
[
RKnett+1 +(1− δ)τI,,t+1
]
. One would then have 1− τK = 1 + τIβδ. In
the steady-state, if one taxes returns on capital with a positive tax τK , one would need to subsidy its investment with
a negative tax rate τI hence the perfect substitutability between the two tax instruments. Out of the steady-state, the
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Similarly, the presence of a strictly positive tax on housing rents τH would distort equation (27)
relative to the first best in equation (13). Hence, τH = 0 too. This avoids a wedge between the
value of land between homeowners and tenants. One could argue that also taxing homeowners on
"imputed rents" would remove this wedge. This is true, but a positive tax on actual rents and on
imputed rents will not be first best in the general case because it distorts investment decisions. This
is explored in Propositions 2 and 3 that follow.
Finally, and most importantly here, of the absence of housing taxes is again a necessary condition,
but a particular social optimum is not necessarily decentralized in absence of additional taxes and
transfers. To do so, one needs to adjust the level of the tax of land to transfer and equalize the ratio
of the social marginal utilities of the capitalist and the worker to the desired value of utility desired
given a particular social weight γ. This level of land tax is studied in our first Proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal land tax): With a land tax, a first best can be achieved with the
combination of
1. a zero tax on returns on capital: τK = 0,
2. a zero tax on housing rents: τH = 0,
3. a single tax on land fully redistributed to workers, with revenue TL = τL¯L¯.
4. In the particular (utilitarian) case γ = 1 where the utilities of capitalist and worker and separable
and identical„ the tax revenue is used to collect the returns to capitalists assets (both housing
and capital) and redistributed them to reach the desired level by the social planner:
τL¯L¯ = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)−
1
2
[f(K) + δK + δS(s+ S)] (31)
5. In the general case γ < 1, there is no such explicit formula, but a similar formula exists in
special cases.
• With an exponential negative sub-utility functions (CARA) lnu(c) = −νc and lnU(C) =
−νC
τL¯L¯ = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)−
1
2
[f(K) + δK + δS(s+ S)]− ln γ
2ν
(32)
two tax instruments are however not perfect substitutes, because the tax on returns τK,t+1 taxes the current capital
stock Kt and therefore past investments, while τI,t+1 taxes the new investments. Since we focus on steady-state, we
leave this aside and only focus on taxes on returns.
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• With instead a CCRA function for the sub-utility of consumption for both the worker and
capitalist U(C) = C
(1−σ)
1−σ and u(c) =
c(1−σ)
1−σ , the optimal land tax for any social welfare
weight for the capitalist is given by
τL¯L¯ = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)− f(K) +
f(K)− δK − δS(s+ S)
1 + γ−σ
(33)
Proof: Given the inelastic supply of land, the homogeneous land tax is not distorting the intra-period
choices. TL enters the government constraint resource and leads, for all values of γ, to
τL¯ = T
L = RHgrossh
(
1 +
c− C − w −K +RKgrossK
2RHgrossh
)
(34)
This revenue is used to transfer to the worker the full amount of rents, plus a correcting term reflecting the
amount of redistribution beyond rental costs to reach optimal levels of consumption. The correcting term
in equation (34) is easier understood in the case where γ = 1: this implies, when the utility functions of
capitalists and workers are identical and separable, that c = C and h = H. In that case, the right hand side
is half of the difference in gross income between the capitalist/landlord and the worker/tenant, plus housing
expenses. After a few easy steps using in particular equation (17) and the definition of returns on capital, one
obtains equation (31) in the Proposition. Equations (32) and (33) follow the same logic. See Appendix B.4.3
for further details. 
In the utilitarian case of 3) above, the simple formula for the optimal property tax implies an equal
sharing rule of total resources of the economy net of depreciation, desired by the social planner. The
social planner uses the tax on land to compensate workers for the extra-returns on capital and land
of the capitalists and equalize their consumption. The product of these taxes is used to redistribute
to the worker so as to insure the optimal level of consumption and housing service and needs to be
positive to redistribute to workers9. The other two formulas apply to the case with γ < 1 in the
CARA (point 4 above) and CRRA (point 5 above) cases. A similar logic of compensation for unequal
property rights applies. As expected, the optimal taxed increases as γ goes down from 1 towards 0.
9The optimal tax may be negative if the capital share in production is small and the capitalist pays large replacement
costs of capital and structures. This is due to the fact that the capitalist and the worker are given an equal demographic
weight. In Appendix Section C we relax this and the introduction of demographic weights never affect the first order
conditions of the decentralized equilibrium and of the social planner, only the resource constraints and the level of
income and consumption of individual agents.
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4.2 Policy constraints on land taxes and rent taxes
Many political constraints prevent the first best from being implemented. As put explicitly by Chari
et al. (2016), it may not be possible to confiscate a fraction of capital owned by capitalists once
and for all. As discussed above, a one-time expropriation of physical capital is not necessary if the
social planner could tax land, especially depending on its use. A land tax plays a similar role to the
one-time taxation of physical capital as its base is inelastic.
Our analysis so far has shown that the tax on land is indeed crucial to get a first best. What we
don’t know yet is the distance between the first best and a world where the tax on land cannot be set
at its optimal value. This is an important case to study since many political economy reasons limit
the use of land taxes, either directly, or indirectly due to the inability to implement them.
The most obvious restriction is the absence of land register. Only 50 countries out of 200 have
one according to van der Molen (2003). The other constraint are more political in nature. First it
appears that the property tax is the most “hated” tax, as coined in Cabral and Hoxby (2012) in the
US, and in Sweden (see Nordblom et al. (2006)). California is famous for the cap on the property
tax (proposition 13, June 6, 1978).
It is sometimes claimed that taxes on imputed rents might restore efficiency. We will discuss
the range of validity of this proposition later, but even when this is true, it may also be difficult to
implement a tax on imputed rent. This is due to the fact that the actual value of the rent is not
observed, homeowners may have a greater reluctance to accept it.
Along a related line of reasoning, it may be much easier to tax actual rents, since this is an income
that is actually observed, despite its distortive aspect. And for the sake of realism, one may want to
explore the possibility of positive tax rents: it is generally treated by the tax authority as a regular
income and therefore subject to an income tax.
Overall, we are now going to study the efficiency aspects of a positive tax on rents, and see under
which conditions and with which additional tax instruments one can restore efficiency, in a Lipsey-
Lancaster’s approach (Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)) to the decentralisation of the first best. We
start with the case where structures are built up and are given, a situation we referred to as inelastic
structures. Next we go on by considering the general case.
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4.3 Efficiency with a positive tax on rents and inelastic structures: a differenti-
ated tax on land and a tax on "imputed rents"
Proposition 1 states that the social planner can achieve its desired outcome by only taxing land, but
this solution requires to give up on taxation of rents because it is distortive: inspection of equations
(27) and (29) implies that a positive tax on rents τH will introduce a wedge from the intra-period
optimality condition, e.g. equation (13).
It is however possible to restore this condition to be exactly that of the first best, in introducing a
differentiated tax on land depending on land use, denoted respectively by τL for the tax on capitalists
land and τl the tax on landlords land, and denoting their difference by ∆τL = τL − τl. In this case,
the social planner has one extra degree of freedom to reach its desired, first best allocation, and this
is true for any social weight.
An alternative and common way to restore efficiency of that particular condition is to introduce a
tax on imputed rents τHI , that is on the "rent equivalent" that owner-occupiers serve to themselves.
However, we will now prove that these two solutions will work only in the absence of structures in
the housing service: if s, S have a non-zero elasticity in H,h, the tax on rent also affects the return
to housing investments, and in particular may lead to sub-optimal investments in rental structures s
in equation (11).
We proceed in two steps. We first abstract away, in this sub-section, from the distortions on s, S
in the Euler equations. This corresponds to the case where housing service has no structures, only
land. In sub-section 4.4.2, we add new instruments that potentially correct for the distortions of
investments in structures and discuss their complexity.
So, in the absence of Euler equation on structures, one can show (see Appendix B.3 and B.4.2)
that the intra-period allocation of land of landlords in the decentralized equilibrium is given by:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH + τHIH
′
L
h′l
+
∆τL
RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(35)
while the first order condition on capital is unchanged.
This leads to a formula for the first-best taxes on land and rents summarized in Proposition 2,
since efficiency requires that the term in brackets must be equal to 1.
Proposition 2 (Distortions and efficient land allocation with rent taxes): In the absence
of structures, that is, when H = H(L) and h = h(l), a positive tax on rent τH does not distort the
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intra-period allocation if and only if it is compensated by:
1. either a positive differential tax on land ∆τL = τL − τl, with:
∆τL = τHRHgrossh′l (36)
2. a tax on imputed rents τHI such that
τHI = τH
h′l
H ′L
(37)
3. if instead the social planner set for simplicity an equal rate for the actual and imputed rents
taxes, that is if τH = τHI , efficiency only arises if the housing service is linear in land;
4. if the service is not linear in land, the equality τH = τHI implies, in the absence of the differen-
tiated land tax, a deviation of L from the first best. The direction of the variation from the first
best depends on the marginal product of land in the housing service. In particular, if tenants
live in smaller housing units, then H
′
L
h′l
< 1 and the quantity of land allocated to tenants is too
small relative the first best, under separability of housing and consumption in utility.
These two options remove the distortion effects of the tax on rents, either by taxing more the
land used by landlords than the tax on rented land, and the differential tax on land evaluated at its
marginal benefits for housing services must be equal to the amount of tax on rents; or by taxing the
housing services of homeowner at a higher level as tenants.
4.4 The case with taxes on rent and with structures
The previous analysis indicated that the intraperiod allocation of land is distorted with positive taxes
on rents, but that the distortion could be corrected by additional taxes on imputed rents. However, as
already alluded to in the text, taxes on rent and imputed rents also affect the two Euler equations on
structure. We start by showing the nature of this inefficiency, and then derive a new set of instruments
to correct it.
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4.4.1 The under-provision of structures
Appendix B.3 shows that with a tax on rent and on imputed rents, the Euler equations are modified
as follows:
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
− τHIRHgrossH ′S (38)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
(39)
It is easy to see that the tax on imputed rents reduces the demand for investments in homeowner
structures S in equation (38), although this may not be a primary concern for social planner interested
only in workers (a zero value for γ). However, in equation (39) the tax on rents reduces the demand
for structures of tenants to a sub-optimal level: landlords under-invest in the walls and other landlord-
provided equipment, leading to a lower quality of the housing service. To summarize:
Proposition 3 (Distortions with structures): There are several deviations from the first best
with taxes on rents with imputed rents.
1. A single tax on actual rents also distorts the investment in housing structures as well as the
intraperiod allocation of space.
2. When the social planner tries to restore the intraperiod allocations of housing between homeown-
ers and tenants with positive imputed rents, this further distorts the investment in structures S
of the capitalist.
3. The outcome of a tax is generally to reduce investments in structures.
• Pose now s = (s/l) the structure quantity per unit of land. The rent tax including imputed
rent entails a new equilibrium with underprovision of s with respect to the first best
• Pose S = SL the capitalist-structure quantity per unit of land. We further assume that
the housing production function is Cobb-Douglas. Then, the rent tax including imputed
rent with compensation for the land distortion considered in Proposition 2.2 leads to a new
equilibrium with underprovision of S with respect to the first best.
This Proposition is rather pessimistic about the ability of the social planner to use a tax on rents.
There are some words of caution here however. First, the social planner does not need to add the
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imputed rent tax, if it can use a differential tax on land to correct the distortions on the intraperiod
allocations of housing between homeowners and tenants. In that case, the only inefficiency left is
that on the Euler equation on tenants’ structures. We now show that these specific inefficiencies may
be corrected with an additional instrument, a set of subsidies on structures. See Appendix B.4.4 for
the details of the proof of the underprovision of structures investments.
4.4.2 Introducing taxes or subsidies on housing structures
We introduce the notations for taxes on structures that are paid by the capitalist (since the capitalist
owns all the structures). The tax can further be differentiated across usages: the structures St devoted
to its own consumption, or the structures st devoted to rental. At this stage, we do not restrict the
sign of the taxes: they can be negative to allow for subsidies if needed, e.g. to favor investment and
possibly correct for distortions from other taxes.
Investment in the structures of St or st may be taxed through flat tax. The tax may be negative
for instance to subsidy renovation, including environmental concerns.
To simplify and to treat both taxes/subsidies symmetrically, we introduce the notations τSt and
τst the tax rates per unit invested, the product of the tax equals:
T s,St = τSt [St+1 − St(1− δS)] + τst [st+1 − st(1− δS)]
In the steady-state, the tax basis is therefore positive and respectively δSS and δSs. We will
assume that the taxes on capitalist’s structures is non-negative but that the tax on rented structures
may be a subsidy10.
Proposition 4 (Restoring the first best with subsidies on structures):
1. In the absence of a tax on rents, a tax on structures is like a tax on capital: it distorts in-
tertemporal choices in a way than cannot be alleviated. The first best requires a zero tax on
investments on structures:
τS = τs = 0
2. With a positive tax on rents, the social planner can compensate the distortion on structures
s induced by the tax on rents by subsidizing structures at the same rate, with the rule τs =
−τH < 0, but it cannot restore the first best on housing consumption choices only with that
10An alternative specification is to tax gross investments net of depreciation, that is to have in the steady-state the
opposite sign for the tax base. This only changes the sign of the tax rate and we keep the current formulation.
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specific subsidy. This requires a differential property tax again, using the same formula as that
in Proposition 2.
3. Symmetrically, a tax on imputed rents leads to a distortion on the structures of capitalists. It
similarly requires a subsidy of their investments in structures, τS < 0.
Proof: Appendix B.3 derives the first order conditions of agents in the general case. With the taxes
considered in this sub-section, these conditions are:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH + τHIH
′
L
h′l
+
∆τL
RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(40)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + 1
1 + τS
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
− τHI
1 + τS
RHgrossH ′S (41)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + 1− τH
1 + τs
u′hh
′
s
u′c
(42)
and the comparison with the social planner’s objective leads to the results. In particular on point 3)
above, one requires from equation (41) and the comparison with the social planner in equation (10) that
τS = −τHI U
′
CR
Hgross
U ′H
. See Appendix B.4.5 for further details.
This set of propositions links the two subsidies on structures and the tax on rents. They show
that the first best is possible even with taxes on rents, but only if one creates new subsidies that are
complex and in some cases, raise the complexity and therefore the costs for the fiscal administration.
From this perspective, a tax on rents is less problematic. Therefore, this section should not be seen as
a full defence of the tax/subsidies combinations that exist in some countries where landlords receive
subsidies to develop new rental units devoted to low rents rental, but it captures some of the rational
for it11.
It is finally easily shown that the previous analysis regarding a rent tax including imputed rent
tax can be generalized to a so-called living tax. Such a tax exists in France and Germany. It is a
tax paid by both workers and capitalists, on their respective housing units. In our framework, this
tax is not particularly compelling since it immediately reduces the living standard of the worker and
requires higher taxes to reach the desired level of consumption. We explore this in Appendix B.4.6 .
11In France for instance, various successive schemes such as Scellier, Pinel and other bills have been passed over the
decades that are inspired from the logic of compensating the taxes on rents by promoting residential investment. See
in particular Bono and Trannoy (2012); Chapelle et al. (2018).
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4.5 Simulations
In the remainder of the text, we will we study the impact on social welfare with a tax on land
that can be differentiated according to its use (rental or occupancy), and compare it to the cases
where are only available, respectively, a tax on rents, a tax on returns to capital, a tax or subsidy to
investments in structures s, S, a tax on imputed rents and some of their combinations. We therefore
study the comparative statics of the decentralized equilibrium. We define the social welfare as the
sum of weighted utility of agents for a given weight γ. When it reaches a maximum with a given
level of taxes and subsidies, this is equivalent to a constrained optimum of the social planner. All our
results are analyzed at the steady state.
4.5.1 Simulation: functional forms and parameters
These simulation exercises are however only illustrative and not meant to be a proper calibration. In
particular, we explore the following context: the utility is linearly separable in consumption of the
good and housing.
The utility functions are assumed to be separable and homogeneous across agents, with iso-elastic
subutility. The housing production functions are also identical across agents and Cobb-Douglas,
as well the production function of goods. The inverse of decay rate for housing corresponds to 50
years. The depreciation rate is higher for machines (10 years). The shares of land and structures
in the production of housing service are assumed to be equal, which corresponds roughly to the
decomposition in Figure 1 at least for France and the UK, the share of land being lower in the US
and Canada). The share of capital is equal to 1/3. The share of housing, that includes shelter
costs and various additional services associated with housing, is conservative with only 15% of total
consumption. To sum up:
u(c, h) =
c1−σc
1− σc + ah
h1−σh
1− σh
h(L¯ − L, s) = (L¯ − L)aL s1−aL
U(C,H) =
C1−σC
1− σC + aH
H1−σH
1− σH
H(L, S) = LaLs1−aL
f(K) = KaK
and benchmark numerical values: β = 0.95, δS = δs = 0.02, δ = 0.1, σC = σc = σH = σh = 0.5,
ah = aH = 0.15, aK = 1/3, aL = 0.5.
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4.5.2 First best tax on land vs. taxes on rents and structures
A first exercise, reported in Figure 2 is to compare the first best taxation on land with alternative tax
profiles. We focus only on low values of γ (0 and 0.25) for which the social planner wants to increase
all types of taxes. The horizontal axis in the top panel is the respective tax rate. In particular, the
tax on land is relative to price of properties: it is defined as τˆL¯ in
τˆL¯ = T
L 1− β
RHnet
(43)
The first best tax on land (curve a on the legend, the curve with upwards triangles) clearly
dominates taxation schemes with no tax on land. A very low tax rate is enough to raise welfare fast,
because the tax base is large and inelastic. Another first best tax scheme is to tax rents, compensated
by a subsidy on structures of tenants and a differential tax on land. This is represented by the curve
with stars (ii, in the legend). The scale for this tax is the tax on rent (or the subsidy on structures
since both are equal). Here, the tax base is therefore smaller, requiring higher taxes.
In contrast, the other, constrained efficient taxes require much larger tax rates to raise welfare and
some of them are either negative or inverted U-shape, due to accumulated distorsions. These taxes
are in decreasing order of progression of welfare: a tax on housing rents compensated by a subsidy
on tenant structures s (iii, on the legend, inverted triangles); a tax on both rents and imputed rents
(iv, line with crosses), a tax on housing rents (v, dashed line); and a tax on structures of capitalists
S (vi, circles), can be compared.
The most effective scheme away from the first best, is to therefore combine a tax on rents and
a subsidy to rental housing structures: it does well initially but the remaining distortion on the
intratemporal allocation of land accumulates as taxes grow and a maximum is reached after a tax
rate of 60%. Taxing rents without subsidies on structures becomes rapidly inefficient. Taxing rents
and imputed rents, is relatively less effective in comparison with the second best taxation of rents
combined with structures subsidy.
In the bottom panels, we report the social welfare function as a function of the total tax revenue
T relative to GDP, defined here using the consumption approach, GDP = C + c+ RHgross(H + h).
The tax on land and the optimal differentiated tax on land to correct for the tax on rents are now
superposed, as both are first best (a and b in the legend). For the pure tax on rents, the curve is
backward bending on this graph. This is a Laffer effect of reducing the tax product above a certain
distortive level. There is no such thing for the land tax which can push up the tax revenues and thus
the transfers to the desired levels. The other taxation schemes contain this Laffer effects too.
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These simulations are illustrative and should be confirmed by a proper calibration. They however
indicate that for this range of parameters values, a tax on rents complemented by a subsidy on struc-
tures of rental housing units does as well as a land tax, but with higher tax rates and a complicated
transfers/taxes scheme.
4.5.3 Impact of the response of structures: tax on capital vs tax on rents
The negative welfare effect arises from the response of structure investment to taxation of rents, as
this reduces the profitability of structures in the rental market which is detrimental to the welfare
of workers. To see the magnitude of this effect, we report in Figure 3 the effect of taxation on rents
with a full response of s, S and as a comparison, the same exercise when structures are maintained
fixed at the initial level. It can be seen that, with γ = 0, the tax on rents that maximizes social
welfare in this constrained optimum is around 0.7 when structures are fixed constant and only 0.3
when structures adjust and the level reached is much below because of the induced disinvestment
in structures s. With γ = 1/4, the optimal tax on rents moves from 0.6 when structures are fixed
constant to slightly above 0 when they adjust and again, taxes on rents lead to a much lower social
welfare after a while.
A last exercise, reported in Figure 4, top panels, compares the taxation of capital and of rents
in the K-H economy (without structures): without ambiguity, the tax on rents τH dominates that of
capital τK , although again, this is because the distortive effect of τH on structures is not taken into
account here. Last, in the absence of housing (the K economy), the effect of a tax on capital is always
negative, as capital stock decreases as taxation increases. Here we only focus on the case γ = 0.
For completeness, a graph superposing to the exercise in Figure 2 the additional tax on capital is
reported in Appendix Figure D.1. It also illustrates the massive distortive effect of capital taxation.
Note however that if capital must be taxed, it is better to also tax rents and imputed rents, to reduce
the distortion in the returns to investments across types of capital (tenant structures and capital)
and in land allocation. This is illustrated in Appendix Figure D.1 by lines vii and viii in the legend.
See for instance Skinner (1996) on this point. In Appendix Figure D.2, one further compares taxes
on capital K, on rents RH and on homeowners structures S, showing again that the distortion of
physical capital taxation is larger than taxation of structures: structures are attached to a fixed factor
(land) and returns on structures are less elastic to taxation than returns on physical capital.
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(a) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0 (b) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0.25
(c) Welfare and tax Product, γ = 0 (d) Welfare and tax Product, γ = 0.25
Figure’s notes. Variation in the social welfare function u(c)+γU(C) and the tax revenue in the decentralized
equilibrium, for different values of γ, the social welfare weight (respectively 0 and 1/4). Comparison
between the first best policy (i), a homogeneous tax on land τˆL (plain green line with triangles up), or its
variant (ii) with a positive tax on rents, a differentiated tax on land and a subsidy to housing structures of
tenants (discontinued green line with stars), and second best policies: (iii) a tax on rents compensated by
a subsidy on residential investments τs < 0 (plain black line with triangles down), (iv) a tax on rent equal
to a tax on imputed rents τH = τHI (plain blue line with cross), (v) a tax on rents τH alone (discontinued
blue line); (vi) a tax on homeowners structures τS > 0 (plain purple line with squares). Top panels: x-axis
is the respective tax rates; bottom panels: x-axis is is the respective total tax revenue.
Figure 2: The relative impact of different tax schemes on the social welfare function (economy with
physical capital, housing, land and structures).
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(a) γ = 0 (b) γ = 0.25
Figure’s notes. Variation in the social welfare function u(c) + γU(C) in the decentralized equilibrium.
Comparison between tax on rents τH when structures S and s react to it (dashed line) and the counter-
factual (circles) in which they are maintained fixed at the pre-tax level τH = 0 for different values of γ,
the social welfare weight (respectively 0 and 1/4).
Figure 3: The role of housing structures on the impact of taxes on rents (economy with physical
capital, housing, land and structures, vs. economy with only physical capital and land).
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(a) Tax on capital in the K-H economy (b) Tax on rent in the K-H economy
(c) Capital tax in the K economy
Figure’s notes. Variation in the Rawlsian social welfare function u(c) + γU(C) with γ = 0 in the decen-
tralized equilibrium. Comparison between the tax on capital τK (K-H model, top left chart), the tax on
rents τH (K-H model, top right chart) and the tax on capital in the absence of housing (K-model, bottom
chart).
Figure 4: Comparing the tax on physical capital and tax on rents in an economy with physical capital
and land or only capital).
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4.6 Ramsey-second best results and the convergence of multipliers
So far we show that the ability of the social planner to redistribute is limited by the elastic response
of investments in physical capital as well as that of residential investments. Given the order of
magnitude of the gains from land taxation observed in the simulation exercises, the social planner
would have more to gain from implementing a first best tax on land owners than in trying to reach
a constrained optimum with taxes on rents and subsidized on residential investments.
Nevertheless, in this Sub-Section we will investigate the second best optima in the Ramsey sense.
At this stage we have not been able to derive additional results when structures are added since they
add two dynamic (Euler) equations to a system that is already complex to solve dynamically, and we
assume from now on that Ht = Lt and ht = lt.
4.6.1 Definition and issues
The optimal taxation problem in the absence of the first best solutions is complex. It involves
convergence problems emphasized in Straub and Werning (2018) that we interpret as a non-concavity
of the constraints faced by the social planner. We will however attempt to provide some partial results
in line with those already discussed.
We study a Ramsey problem of choosing among two distortive tax instruments: either a constant
tax rate on “new” capital or a constant tax rate on housing rents. With the revenues, the govern-
ment finances redistribution from capitalists to workers. We exclude from the outset a lump-sum
tax on capitalists, because we want to rule out confiscation of capital. The social decision maker
maximizes social welfare under the following constraints: the resource constraint of the economy
for each period, the FOCs of the capitalist (Euler, intra-period allocation between consumption and
housing, transversality) and the FOC of the worker. An important dimension here is the level of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
4.6.2 Restatement of Judd’s result without housing in the K-model (no housing)
In the original Judd’s model in the absence of housing, the social planner’s program reads:
Max
ct,Ct,,Kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(ct) + γU(Ct)]
s.t. ct + Ct +Kt+1 = f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt
βU ′C(Ct)(Ct +Kt+1)− U ′C(Ct−1)Kt = 0
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with a transversality constraint βtU ′C(Ct)Kt+1 → 0 and an initial stock of capital K0 given. The
multiplier of the resource constraint equation is λ and µ denotes the multiplier of the Euler equation.
As discussed in Straub and Werning (2018), in their framework, this is necessary and sufficient to
have σC below unity to insure that µ converges. We will show that a similar condition holds here,
although the cutoff point is no longer 1 but a larger value.
Judd’s result in the version given by Straub and Werning (2018) can be summarized in the next
Lemma, proved in Appendix12:
Lemma 1: Straub and Werning (2018): Suppose quantities and multipliers converge to an interior
steady state, i-e., Ct, ct and Kt converge to positive values and µt converges. Then the tax on capital
is zero in the limit.
We provide next an intermediate result that complements Judd’s statement as it appears in the
above proposition. We focus to a case already considered by Straub-Werning and assume that the
capitalist’s utility derived from consumption is iso-elastic, that is, there exist σC , the inverse of
which being the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) with σC > 0 and σC 6= 1 such that
U(C) = C
1−σC
1−σC .
A useful notation captures the distance to the social planner’s first best in terms of the ratio of
marginal utilities: let the quantity γ˜c captures this, with γ˜c = γ
U ′(C)
u′(c) . This ratio of marginal utility
weighted by social welfare weights, 1 for the worker and γ for the capitalist, should be equal to 1
in the first best. In a second best analysis, the consumption of capitalists should be higher than
the consumption of workers and then typically γ˜c < 1, and the lower γ˜c, the farther the second best
is from the first best. Even if γ˜c is related to one of the primitives of the model, γ, it is clearly
endogenous.
Lemma 2: Suppose quantities converge to an interior steady state. Then the multiplier µt con-
verges to µ = γ(1−γ˜c)γ˜c(1−σC) and is positive iff (1 − γ˜c)(1 − σC) > 0. More specifically, if γ˜c < 1 then the
convergence of multipliers (to a positive number) occurs if and only if σC < 1.
The convergence of the Euler condition multiplier arises when three conditions are met: σC < 1
(intertemporal elasticity of substitution larger than 1), the capitalist consumes more than the worker
and the social welfare weight γ of the capitalist is lower than that of the worker. The condition γ˜c < 1
is always satisfied at the second best for a redistributive social planner (with γ < 1).
12Note that we have treated each agent in the social planner program as representative, the social planner is free to
choose a γ that corrects for the different number of agents. Indeed, we make all proofs with a mass of capitalists that
can be treated as a parameter m. This mass will simply be isomorphic to the social weight of capitalists and therefore
ex post does not matter.
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We are now ready to characterize the second best optimum with housing but we will do it within
the frame of the above proposition. In particular, we will first restrict our attention to the case of
σC < 1 before proving additional results in the extension to the case σC > 1.
4.6.3 Second best taxation in the K-H-model (with housing)
We specify the preferences of both agents to be separable, with U(Ct, Ht) = UC(Ct) + UH(Ht)
and u(ct, H¯ − Ht) = uc(ct) + uh(ht). We still assume UC(C) = C1−σC1−σC and uc(c) = c
1−σc
1−σc . At
this stage, UH(.) and uh(.) remain general instead, we simply denote by σH(H) = −HU ′′H/U ′H and
σh(h) = −hu′′h/u′h the (non-constant) coefficients of relative risk aversion of the utility for housing of
respectively homeowners and tenants.
The separability assumption allows us to simplify the proofs of the next propositions. Consider
the planner program with housing:
max
ct,Ct,Ht,Kt+1τH,t
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct, H¯ −Ht) + γU(Ct, Ht)
]
such that:
ct + Ct +Kt+1 = f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt = 0, multiplier λ
βU ′C(t)(Ct +Kt+1 −RHgrosst (1− τH,t)(H¯ −Ht)− U ′C(t− 1)Kt = 0, multiplier µ
RHgrosst u
′
c-u′h= 0, multiplier η1
RHgrosst (1− τH,t)U ′C(t)− U ′H(t) = 0 , multiplier η2
τH,t.Φ = 0, multiplier Φ ≥0
βtU ′C(Ct)Kt+1 → 0
We introduce another indicator of distance to the social planner’s first best, in the housing di-
mension this time: γ˜h = γ
U ′H(H)
u′h(h)
. As for consumption, we expect γ˜h to be lower than 1 at the second
best optimum. The main result of this section is in the next Proposition.
Proposition 5 (Optimal capital tax in the Ramsey problem with housing): Assume that
the following instruments are available to the decision maker: a tax on capital, a lump sum benefit
to workers and a tax on rents. Consider an economy where the preferences of both the capitalist
and workers are separable, with a CCRA sub-additive utility of consumption. Suppose that quantities
converges to an interior steady state and that σC < 1, γ˜c < 1 and γ˜h < 1, then the optimal tax on
capital is 0 and the optimal tax on rents is positive in the limit. Consequently the stock of capital in
the second best remains equal to the stock of capital in the first best.
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The proposition amounts to proving that both the numerator and denominator of the multiplier
of Euler’s equation in the social planner’s program are positive, as displayed in Appendix D, equation
(D.22). A value σ < 1 is sufficient for this multiplier to be positive. We offer the following inter-
pretation of the result. In a static setting, Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a,b) obtains a very robust
result in optimal taxation: they show that it is better not to distort production and therefore not to
tax intermediate goods. However, depending on the context, it may be second best optimal to tax
consumption. According to Chari et al. (2016), these results cannot be directly applied to a dynamic
setting because of variations in labor productivity in time, that depends on the capital stock. Never-
theless, the intuition conveyed by the Diamond-Mirlees papers still holds in our context, specifically
in the steady state. Housing is a consumption good and under some conditions it can be optimal to
tax it, while it is not optimal to tax capital because it is an intermediate good. In addition, the fact
that developed land is in fixed supply in our model leads to simpler proofs.
Another proposition delivers the optimal tax formula which is an inverse elasticity rule à la
Ramsey:
Proposition 6 (Ramsey-optimal rent tax): The optimal rent tax is given by
τH
1− τH =
1− γ˜c
s
where s the supply elasticity of rental housing land with respect to net rent. The supply elasticity
with respect to net rent should be equal in absolute terms to the demand elasticity with respect to gross
rent at the equilibrium of the rental market.
Note also that in the simplest case of the same constant relative risk aversion function for the
sub-utility of housing as for consumption (σC = σh = σH), one obtains in addition that s= 1σH , and
the formula is τH1−τH = σH(1− γ˜c).
Assume σh, σH > 0. In this case, one does not require σC > 1 to obtain a convergent program:
σ only need to be lower than a cutoff elasticity, defined from Appendix equation (D.22). In that
equation, the numerator is positive and the denominator is positive if and only if:
σC < σ
∗
C =
1
1− hRHnetc ( 1σh + hH
σH
σh
)
≥ 1 (44)
Proposition 7 (Range of convergence of Ramsey solutions with housing): Even if
σC ≥ 1, as long as σC < σ∗C where σ∗C ≥ 1, the convergence of multipliers still holds, as in Lemma
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2. Instead, consistent with Straub and Werning (2018), in the absence of housing consumption that
is when the share of housing hR
Hnet
c is close to zero, one finds σ
∗
C = 1 in the limit case in which
preferences are such that the housing consumption share of workers tends to zero relative to the
consumption of the composite goods.
Our second best optimal taxation result in Proposition 6 holds for a large set of parameters,
in particular with an IES smaller than 1, within a range that can be large. The intuition for the
extension in the range is the following: when σC > 1, the substitution effect of taxation is smaller than
the income effect of taxation. In the absence of housing, capital taxation would normally increase
savings, leading to the divergence of multipliers as soon as σC < 1. Adding up land and a new tax
instrument related to land, we can partially relax this effect and the set of parameters leading to
interior solutions of second best taxation is therefore larger.
To fix ideas, if σh = σH = 1, the share of housing in consumption of tenants is 0.125 and the
ratio of aggregate housing of each agents is h/H = 213, one has σ∗ = 1/(1− 0.125/0.875 ∗ 3) = 1.75.
Our result can be brought closer to to the interpretation of Chari et al. (2016) according to which the
result of Straub and Werning (2018) of heavy taxation of capital when IES is lower than 1 is to some
extent an illustration of an incomplete set of fiscal instruments. They show that with a moderate
consumption taxation in the second period, we do not need to tax capital anymore.
One can provide a further result in the particular case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, U(c, h) =
φ log h + (1 − φ) log c, and on the production side, the Cobb-Douglas function Y = KaKL1−aK . In
this case it is possible to show an explicit formula for the optimal second best tax of rents. We can
state (see Appendix D.2 for the proof) that:
Corollary: There is a unique second best optimal tax rate τH obtained as the root of the second
degree equation. The tax rate is decreasing with the social welfare weight γ of the capitalist which
means that the upper bound of the optimal range of tax rate is 50%.
The optimal tax on rents is implicitly given by
τH =
1
2
− γ
2
1− φ
φ
1
1 + K∗φw∗ +
τH
1−τH
1−φ
φ
K∗
w∗
(45)
where K∗ = βK∗/(1 − β) is obtained from the stationary value of capital K∗. With reasonable
calibration values described in Section 3.4, we will obtain a tax rate on rents of 40%. In Appendix
13Away from the assumptions of equal weights of workers and capitalists, h/H is replaced in the proofs by h/(Hm)
where m is the mass of capitalists. Hence, this back-of-the-envelope calculations corresponds to a ratio of the land
consumed by agent over capitalists equal to 2.
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we introduce an arbitrary mass of capitalists m < 1 and the term γ becomes mγ in equation (45).
In both cases, the Rawlsian program leads to the highest possible taxation of τH = 1/2, while in the
utilitarian case, the rate is below 50%.
5 Literature review
This paper touches different topics that we all discuss in this Section. First, it is a paper on wealth
and capital accumulation. The rise of the capital/income ratio and its implications on inequalities
derived in Piketty (2014) have generated many contributions that responded to various challenges of
the main thesis: Krusel and Smith (2014), Rognlie (2016), Acemoglu and Robinson (2015), Stiglitz
(2015a,b), Mankiw and Summers (2015), Weil (2015), Auerbach and Hassett (2015), Jones (2015),
Kopczuk (2015), Hildenbrand (2016). There have been several directions in these works: critics
related to the inability of the model to account for varying rates of return on capital especially in
the limits of infinite accumulation; critics of the fact that the net elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor is below 1 in most studies while for the share of capital in national income and the
capital-to-wealth ratio to co-move positively it should be above 1; critics on the data used to assess
the explicit and the simple theory that risk-adjusted returns to capital are greater than GDP growth
(r > g) leads to inflation of capital over GDP; critics of the lack of differentiation between wealth
and capital.
A particular line of discussion was the recognition that earnings of capital relative to GDP had not
evolved as much as the ratio capital to GDP. We notably documented this in detail in our previous
work (Bonnet et al., 2014) in France with the apparent inconsistency of the data with the “first law of
capitalism”: the positive co-movement between the capital share and the capital to income ratio is not
visible in the data. This suggested that an important ingredient was either missing or at least deserved
more emphasis. This missing piece that we discussed in that paper is the heterogeneity of capital, that
naturally appears when one explicitly distinguish wealth from capital14. The discussions on capital
have always led to the greatest economic controversies. The most famous of which was between the
two Cambridge, in the 1960s. The debate was about possible inconsistencies and tautologies in the
measurement of the capital stock and its earnings, as well as the nature of capital and the difference,
if any, with pure wealth. Housing in particular has a market value (wealth) that may be disconnected
from its returns especially for homeowners.
Second, this paper is part of a very dynamic literature on capital taxation for redistributive rea-
14We follow the recent analysis of China in Piketty et al. (2019) where authors report wealth to GDP ratios (Figures
3, 4, 5, 7a to d, etc, pages 49 to 56), and not capital to GDP ratios.
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sons15. In the early work of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b), capital as an intermediate good should
not be taxed under linear tax schedules. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) favor non-linear labor tax-
ation instead. In the Ramsey framework, Chamley (1986) argues that future capital investments
should not be taxed in the long-run, within the range of convergent paths, as well as Judd (1985) in
a second-best convergent paths with workers without assets. Under the assumption of uninsurable
shocks, Aiyagari (1994) corrects the overaccumulation of capital for precautionary motives with a
capital tax instead. With asymmetries of information on individual’s characteristics, Golosov et al.
(2003) establish a similar result under non-linear tax schemes. A subsequently central mechanism
to the literature pioneered by this article is that wealth raises leisure and reduces work incentives.
Judd’s paper was subsequently revisited by several authors. Lansing (1999)’s finding is that under log
preferences, optimal capital taxes could be positive forever at some interior steady state. Reinhorn
(2019) shows that it is the only way in which an interior steady state can violate the zero tax result
in Judd’s framework. Out of the steady-state, Straub and Werning (2018) discuss non-convergent
paths in Judd’s analysis. In particular, with low elasticities of intertemporal substitution, savings is
too important and taxing capital must lead to long-term expropriation, while with higher elasticities,
taxes tend to zero, but from simulations, the convergence is very slow. In a more general setting Bas-
setto and Benhabib (2006) and Benhabib and Szőke (2019) establish that with more heterogeneity
in wealth, a positive capital tax rate can prevail in the steady state, without considering knife-edge
preferences. The last authors consider with CRRA preferences and constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production functions and an uneven distribution of wealth. They show that in the framework
of neo-classical growth model, agents in the bottom or middle part of the distribution may prefer the
redistributive effects associated to a tax on capital forever even if it entails large inefficiency costs.
It would be interesting to see whether our results convey to this more general setting. Chien and
Wen (2019) build an infinite-horizon Aiyagari-type model and find there zero taxation of capital in
the long-run. In the transition path, the level of optimal capital tax also depends on the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. In our paper, we limit our analysis to the long-run, and have no precau-
tionary saving nor leisure that could leads to similar results as the literature above. In particular,
we do not address the complex dynamics paths, although we showed that with a fixed factor, the
range of parameters needed to converge for the land market and the intertemporal substitution may
be different.
Third, our paper is about the heterogeneity of capital and in particular the role of land as a fixed
factor generating rents. The question of optimal land and housing taxation used to be central. A
15See for instance Ndiaye (2017)
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seminal contribution can be viewed in Henry George (1879)’s book, "Progress and Poverty", advocat-
ing for a single tax on land. This contribution was adapted to the urban economics framework with
the famous Henry-George Theorem developed in Arnott and Stiglitz (1979) which states that, at an
optimal city size, a land rent tax is the only tax needed; it is sufficient to finance local public goods.
This theorem was recently reformulated in a dynamic and macroeconomics setting by Mattauch et al.
(2013). The authors derive an optimal public investment formula in terms of the land rent. An impor-
tant assumption in their work, and a difference with the urban literature, is that residential land do
not enter the utility function. Prominent economists subsequently shared the view that land should
be taxed. William Vickrey wrote in Vickrey (1996): "removing almost all business taxes, including
property taxes on improvements, excepting only taxes reflecting the marginal social cost of public ser-
vices rendered to specific activities, and replacing them with taxes on site values, would substantially
improve the economic efficiency of the jurisdiction."; a quote from Milton Friedman supports the
land tax: "In my opinion, the least bad tax is the property tax on the unimproved value of land,
the Henry George argument of many, many years ago.”; while a manifesto of economists (William
Vickrey, Jacques Thisse, Tibor Scitovsky, James Tobin, Richard Musgrave, Franco Modigliani, Zvi
Griliches, William Baumol, Robert Solow among others) wrote a Letter to Gorbatchev in 1990 “It is
important that the rent of land be retained as a source of government revenue. While the governments
of developed nations with market economies collect some of the rent of land in taxes, they do not
collect nearly as much as they could, and they therefore make unnecessarily great use of taxes that
impede their economies–taxes on such things as incomes, sales and the value of capital.”
Fourth, the introduction of land in the optimal taxation literature was adressed in Stiglitz (2015a).
He shows that, when land is only a productive input, its taxation would increase the consumption of
workers. In his setting there is only one consumption good and land does not provide a housing service.
The model leaves aside residential land to focus on land consumed by firms. Eerola and Määttänen
(2013) on the other hand, addresses specifically the question of housing taxation. They develop a
model with a representative agent that derives utility from non-housing consumption, leisure and
housing which is only composed by its structure and has no land component. This key assumption
leads to the conclusion that “in the first-best, the tax treatment of business and housing capital
should always be the same”, and that in “the second-best, in contrast, the optimal tax treatment of
housing capital depends on the elasticities of substitution between non housing consumption, housing,
and leisure”. The model is also silent on the role of residential land. Our optimal taxation of land
and rents in the second best rejoins these recent approaches but accounts for the fact that land is
consumed by households through housing services and thus enters the utility function.
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Fifith, different models with an intergenerational structures provide additional insights. In Over-
lapping Generation Models (OLG), land and housing represent savings vehicles. For example, Buiter
(2010) insists on the fact that housing (composed by land and structure) is not wealth. He finds that
individual consumption is unchanged if housing prices increase in line with the fundamentals (hence
the exclusion of bubbles). Regarding taxation, OLG models leave more room for positive optimal
tax rates on capital (Conesa et al., 2009) because of potential dynamic inefficiencies. However, this
does not mean that land and housing should not be treated differently. One interesting point was
raised in Deaton and Laroque (2001) which introduces land in the consumption function of a standard
OLG growth model and shows that land markets introduce large distortions making the case for its
nationalization. As such an extreme scenario might by difficult to realize, complementary discussions
on land taxation might be required. A first answer can be found in Chamley and Wright (1987) who
analyzes the fiscal incidence of a land tax but as in Stiglitz (2015a) and Eerola and Määttänen (2013),
land does not enter the consumption function. Kim and Lee (1997) suggest that a land tax is likely to
create dynamic inefficiency distorting the no arbitrage condition rely on the same assumption. More
recently, Nakajima (2010) developed an OLG model taking into account the specific tax treatment of
housing income and the difference across occupation status. In such a framework when imputed rents
are not taxed, the author finds that Conesa et al. (2009) results may not hold and that what is called
“malleable” capital should almost not be taxed. The intuition is similar as Eerola and Määttänen
(2013): housing and productive capital should not be taxed differently provided that land is not a
component of housing. When investigating the fiscal incidence in this framework, housing is only
composed by the structure and land is ignored with the exception of Skinner (1996) who develops
an OLG model where housing comes in fixed supply and can thus be assimilated to land. This work
does not discuss what should be the optimal tax rates of different types of capital but documents the
large welfare cost generated by the preferential tax treatment of housing when productive capital is
taxed. We go beyond Skinner (1996) and argue that due to the fixity of land, returns to homeowners
housing structures can be taxed more than capital, and instead that residential structures must be
subsidized.
6 Conclusion
One upon a time, land was a central piece of the classical analysis. But it has been moved at the
periphery of modern theory of prices. Several recent evolutions however point towards the need to
reinstate land: housing represents between 20 and 30% of consumer expenditures and at least 40% of
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household wealth. In most places, prices of developed land surge, in particular in metropolitan areas.
Reintroducing land and land price leads to the natural conclusion that land tax must be positive
and large. This idea does not need to be confined to urban economics where it already plays a key
role, as beautifully advocated for the funding of local public goods with the so-called Henry-George
theorem. The importance of land taxes goes beyond the microeconomics of cities and naturally
embraces the issue of redistribution at the macro level with implications on long-term growth. We
therefore see Piketty’s contribution as important to trigger a revival on this land issue. Our reading of
his empirical findings is that the growth of the wealth-income ratio is mainly a housing phenomenon,
whereas, instead, the ratio of physical capital to income is fluctuating around 2 without any neat
trend in every country, despite evidence of accrued concentration.
Our first part documents that capital is heterogeneous and the recent inflation of housing wealth
matters more than before: since a large part of housing reflects the underlying fixed factor (land).
Our second set of conclusions is normative. In terms of optimal taxation, it is crucial to distinguish
between produced capital and housing (physical capital and structures) and land. Indeed, taxing
land (or property) enables to make transfers from landowners to workers/tenants and to increase the
income of the latter. However, taxing physical capital or housing structures through a tax on rents
has distortive effects. The quantitative exercises in this paper suggests that taxing rents may increase
the social welfare of a planner willing to redistribute. Distortive effects may be important, but can
be alleviated with subsisdies to housing investments. Absent these subsisidies, a courageous effort to
tax land leads to large welfare gains of the order of magnitude higher, say between 5 to 20%.
The analysis led us to conclude (more optimistically, or perhaps just less pessimistically) that
long-run trends in wealth may eventually become good news for policy makers if they are able to
implement non-distortive redistribution. Our analysis indicates that differentiating wealth taxes
by type of wealth allows for a lighter taxation on physical capital than on housing structures of
homeowners, themselves lighter than developed land.
Lastly, the Judd model used as a benchmark in this paper is a natural framework to reintroduce
land and housing in dynamic public finance. It should be noted that it is an extreme “Piketty’s world”
since all productive capitals belong to the capitalist hands. We acknowledge that the analysis must
be pursued to understand better the concentration of capital in some hands and not others, and how
intergenerational forces affect the dynamics of wealth accumulation through capital and land.
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A The measurement of housing capital by statistical agencies: the
example of France (INSEE)
Piketty and Zucman’s measurement of capital "follows the most recent international guidelines as set forth in
the 2008 System of National Accounts" Piketty and Zucman (2013). They use series of statistical agencies to
measure their capital/income ratio. The measurement of capital, and in particular housing capital, follows a
particular methodology which is summarized and highlight to justify the adjustments proposed here.
According to OECD (2001), the framework used in several countries is the perpetual inventory methodology
(PIM) briefly described by Piketty and Zucman: "The goal of the perpetual inventory method (PIM) is to
approximate the current market value of a number of capital assets when it cannot be directly observed. The
general idea is that this value can be approximated by cumulating past investment flows and making suitable
price adjustments." Piketty and Zucman (2013).
Our main interest will be in the "suitable price adjustments" for the housing market, namely the price
index used to evaluate the value of the volume of capital. The perpetual inventory methodology used by the
French institute of statistics (INSEE) to provide an estimate of the national housing capital stock is described
as follows.
A.1 Measurement of the stock (volume) of housing capital in a reference year
"In France, housing capital is estimated through a first step of estimating the total stock and value of housing in
a reference year (1988). INSEE then follows over time the evolution of the number of buildings from aggregate
housing investments, deflated the housing construction index; and the evolution of land with constructs using
the evolution of the surface area covered by housing units and the development of the surface area covered by
houses. To get the year- by-year value of housing capital stock, the above- described volume is multiplied by
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the price index of existing housing. Furthermore, new buildings were also evaluated at the price of existing
housing units. Hence, housing capital follows year-to-year evolutions of housing prices, by contraction."
The assessment of the housing capital starts indeed from an initial survey-based assessment in the reference
year. Two main surveys of 1988 (French Housing Survey and Survey on building land16 were used to assess
the housing capital stock divided between buildings and their underlying land.
From the surveys we calculate:
KHousing1988 = K
Dwelling
1988 +K
land
1988
where the housing capital which is broken down between dwellings and land.
A.2 The time evolution of the volume of housing capital
As we saw, housing capital is divided between land and dwellings, the evolutions of which are followed sepa-
rately.
For dwellings, the stock in the following years is computed iteratively from the initial year17 taking into
account depreciation (δ)18 and yearly capital increments (Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF)) deflated
by construction costs index (CCI)19:
V ol(KDwellingn+1 ) = (1− δ)V ol(KDwellingn ) +
GFCFn+1
CCIn+1
For land, the statistical agency similarly follows the changes in developed land on the national territory
with respect to the reference year using an index of the surface developed (S):
V ol(Klandn+1 ) = Sn+1 ×Kland1988
Finally, the volume of housing capital is just the addition of both series for each year at the price of the
reference year, here 198820:
V ol(KHousingn+1 ) = V ol(K
Dwelling
n+1 ) + V ol(K
land
n+1 )
16In 1988, two surveys are available: the housing survey “Enquête Logement”, (EL) and information gathered by tax
authority on land price (from the IMO file from the Direction Générale des Impôts which provides for the last time in
1988 an evaluation of the price of building land) Baron (2008).
17For each of these years after 1988, the value of the stock of housing will be calculated step by step.Baron (2008).
18From the CCF rate (that is, the depreciation rate) we compute net capital.Baron (2008)
19To evaluate the net capital of 1988 at 2000s prices, we deflate using the construction cost index as a price index
for buildings Baron (2008).
20E.g., the volume of housing capital at the end of 1989 (at 1988 prices) is found adding the net capital flow of end
1989 evaluated at 1988 prices Baron (2008).
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A.3 Pricing of the evolution of housing capital and decomposition
The volume of capital is then obtained multiplying its volume by the house price index21 (HP):
KHousingn+1 = HPn+1 × V ol(KHousingn+1 )
This value (used in Capital in the 21st Century) is then broken down into land and dwellings. This step
appears to be the most important to understand our reasoning since it shows that housing capital is evaluated
at the market price of year n+1. The Value of the structure alone can be recovered by multiplying the Volume
of dwelling with the Construction Price Index:
KDwellingn+1 = V ol(K
Dwelling
n+1 )× CCIn+1
The developed Land Capital is the residual:
Klandn+1 = K
Housing
n+1 −KDwellingn+1
B Theory Appendix: Social planner’s allocation and decentralized
equilibrium with structures
B.1 Steady-state in the K-H-S-s model
Here we report in the most general case the first order conditions of the social planner and of the decentralized
equilibrium as in the text. Given the Inada conditions assumed in the text, all partial derivatives are strictly
between 0 and infinity.
B.2 Social planner’s objective
We have:
∂Ct, ct λt = γU
′
C(t) = u
′
c(t) (B.1)
∂Lt γU ′HH ′L(t) = u′hh′l(t) (B.2)
∂St+1 λt = βλt+1(1− δS) + γβU ′HH ′S(t+ 1) (B.3)
∂st+1 λt = βλt+1(1− δS) + βu′hh′s(t+ 1) (B.4)
∂Kt+1 λt = βλt+1R
Kgross(t+ 1) (B.5)
21"The housing patrimony at the end of 1989 is obtained multiplying by the price index for the whole France " Baron
(2008).
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This notably implies the following steady-state relations:
∂Ct, ct λ = γU
′
C = u
′
c (B.6)
∂Lt γU ′HH ′L = u′hh′l (B.7)
Euler St+1 β
−1 =
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
+ 1− δS (B.8)
Euler st+1 β
−1 =
u′hh
′
S
u′c
+ 1− δS (B.9)
Euler Kt+1 β
−1 = RKgross = f ′(K) + 1− δ (B.10)
B.3 Decentralized equilibrium
We start from the most general tax structure, to save on calculations later on. We therefore consider all
settings considered in the main text as particular cases. As compared to the text, we also add a tax on
investments in physical capital τI treated symmetrically with the taxes/subsidies on structures to show its
substitutability with the tax on returns.
We consider τSt and τst as (net) taxes (a negative value is a subsidy) per unit invested, and the product
of the tax is equal to:
T s,St = τSt [St+1 − St(1− δS)]+τst [st+1 − st(1− δs)] (B.11)
By symmetry, we similarly introduce a tax on net investment,
T It = τI,t [Kt+1 −Kt(1− δ)]
and net returns on capital are taxed too:
TKt = τK,t [f
′(Kt) + 1− δ]
and use the notation for the net return on capital as:
RKnett =R
Kgross
t (1− τK,t)
In the steady-state, the tax basis is therefore positive and respectively δSS and δss, and taxes on land are
potentially differentiated, with τL the tax on the land occupied by landlords, and τl the tax on land developed
for tenants, and therefore a tax revenue on land equal to:
TLt = τLL+ τl(L¯ − L)
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opening the door for a correction in the allocation of land by landlords. When the tax rates are identical, we
denote them (in the text or in this Appendix) as τL¯ = τL = τl.
Rents are also taxed at a rate τH,t. A tax on imputed rents for the landlord may be possible. It is
introduced as τHI,t. Both lead to a revenue:
THt = τH,tR
Hgross
t ht + τHI,tR
Hgross
t Ht
and we use the notation for the net return on housing investments as:
RHnett = R
Hgross
t (1− τH,t)
Finally, we allow for a living tax, paid by all residents (homeowners and tenants). The tax revenue is
calculated at the rent or implicit rent (gross), and the tax rate is denoted by τliv,t and leads to revenue:
T livt = τliv,tR
Hgross
t (Ht + ht)
Overall, all taxes sum up to deliver the total amount taxed Tt:
Tt = T
liv
t + T
H
t + T
K
t + T
I
t + T
s,S
t
while the total net transfer is instead:
Transfertt = τliv,tR
Hgross
t (Ht) + T
H
t + T
K
t + T
I
t + T
s,S
t
It is interesting to note that the living tax for the landlord is calculated in the same way as for the imputed
rent. In what follows, we keep track of these two perfect substitute taxes and the sum τliv + τHI appear in all
FOC of the capitalist, as the sum of the living tax and the imputed rent tax for the landlord.
Then, the program of the capitalist is
max
Ct,Ht,Lt,Kt+1,st+1,St+1
∑
t
βt {U(Ct, H(Lt, St))}
+βtλKt
{
RKnett Kt + (1 + τI,t)(1− δ)Kt +RHgrosst (1− τH,t)ht(L¯ − Lt, st))
−(τliv,t + τHI,t)RHgrosst Ht
+(1− δS)(1 + τSt)St + (1− δs)(1 + τst)st − TLt
−Ct − St+1(1 + τSt)− st+1(1 + τst)−Kt+1(1 + τI,t)}
subject to subject to βtU ′C(t)Mt+1 → 0, for Mt = Kt, St, st .
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The program of the worker is:
max
ct,ht
u(ct, ht)
subject to ct + htR
Hgross
t (1 + τliv,t) = wt + Tt
We have, denoting by λwt the multiplier of the constraint of the worker, and λKt the multiplier of the
constraint of the capitalist, and ∆τL,t = τL,t − τl,t:
Worker: intraperiod
∂ct u
′
c = λ
w
t (B.12)
∂ht u
′
h(t) = λ
w
t R
Hgross
t (t)(1 + τliv,t) (B.13)
⇔ u′h(t) = u′cRHgrosst (1 + τliv,t) (B.14)
Capitalist: intraperiod
∂Ct U
′
C(t) = λ
K
t (B.15)
∂Lt U ′HH ′L(t) = λKt
(
Rgrosst (1− τH,t)h′l(t) + ∆τL + (τliv,t + τHI,t)RHgrosst H ′L(t)
)
(B.16)
Capitalist: intertemporal (Euler)
∂St+1 λ
K
t (1 + τSt) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δS)(1 + τSt) + βU ′HH ′S(t+ 1)
− λKt+1β(τliv,t+1 + τHI,t+1)RHgrosst+1 H ′S(t+ 1) (B.17)
∂st+1 λ
K
t (1 + τst) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δs)(1 + τst) + βλKt+1RHgrosst+1 (1− τH,t+1)h′s(t+ 1) (B.18)
∂Kt+1 λ
K
t (1 + τI,t+1) = βλ
K
t+1
[
RKnett+1 +(1− δ)τI,t+1
]
(B.19)
or in the steady-state,
Worker: intraperiod
u′h = u
′
cR
Hgross(1 + τliv) (B.20)
Capitalist: intraperiod
∂Ct U
′
C = λ
K (B.21)
∂Lt U ′HH ′L = U ′C
(
RHgross(1− τH)h′l + ∆τL + (τliv + τHI)RHgrossH ′L
)
(B.22)
Capitalist: intertemporal (Euler)
∂S U ′C(1 + τS) = βU
′
C(1− δS)(1 + τS) + βU ′HH ′S
− U ′Cβ(τliv + τHI)RHgrossH ′S (B.23)
∂s U ′C(1 + τs) = βU
′
C(1− δs)(1 + τs) + βU ′CRHgross(1− τH)h′s (B.24)
∂K U ′C(1 + τI) = βU
′
C
[
RKnet+(1− δ)τI
]
(B.25)
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Re-arranging the terms, using in particular RHgross = u
′
h
u′c
(1 + τliv)
−1, one obtains:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH
1 + τliv
+
τliv + τHI
1 + τliv
H ′L
h′l
+
∆τL
(1 + τliv)RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(B.26)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + 1
1 + τS
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
− τliv + τHI
1 + τS
RHgrossH ′S (B.27)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + 1− τH
1 + τs
1
1 + τliv
u′hh
′
s
u′c
(B.28)
∂K β−1 =
RKgross(1− τK) + (1− δ)τI
1 + τI
(B.29)
The system can be compared to the social planner’s allocation, characterized by the following equation in
the steady-state. We have:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
=
u′c
U ′C
= γ (B.30)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
(B.31)
∂s β−1 = 1− δS + u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
(B.32)
∂K β−1 = RKgross (B.33)
The system described in subsection 3.3.2 and in subsection 4.1 with only taxes on rents and returns to
capital and a homogenous tax on land and in Proposition 1, is:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(1− τH) = u
′
c
U ′C
(B.34)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
(B.35)
∂s β−1 = 1− δS + (1− τH)u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
(B.36)
∂K β−1 = RKnet (B.37)
The system described in subsection 4.3 and Propositions 2 and 3, with the same tax on rents and returns
on capital but a differential tax on land by land use, is given by:
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Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH + ∆τL
RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(B.38)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
(B.39)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH) u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
(B.40)
∂K β−1 = RKnet (B.41)
The system described in Section 4.4.2 and Proposition 4, with the same tax en rents and returns on capital,
a differential tax on land by land use and taxes or subsidies on residential structures s and S is given by:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH + ∆τL
RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(B.42)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + 1
1 + τS
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
(B.43)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + 1− τH
1 + τs
u′hh
′
s
u′c
(B.44)
∂K β−1 = RKnet (B.45)
B.4 Sufficient conditions for first best efficiency
B.4.1 Physical capital
Comparison of social planner Euler equation on capital (B.33) and the general case of the Euler decentralized
equilibrium (B.29) implies that the tax on returns on capital and the tax on investments are redundant and
individually distortive. In other words, if one taxes returns on capital with a positive tax τK , one would need
to subsidy its investment with a negative tax rate τI hence the perfect substitutability between the two tax
instruments. If there is no subsidy nor a tax on private investment, τI = 0, then the optimal taxation result
applies: τK = 0 reaches the first best.
B.4.2 Intra-period housing/consumption allocation
Comparison of the social planner’s equation reflecting intra-period allocations, equation (B.30) and the cor-
responding decentralized equation (B.26) implies that in the decentralized equilibrium, the marginal rate of
substitution of goods consumption and land consumption have to be equalized to that of the first best, which
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is obtained when:
1− τH
1 + τliv,t
+
τliv + τHI
1 + τliv,t
H ′L
h′l
+
∆τL
(1 + τliv,t)RHgrossh′l
= 1 (B.46)
that is:
• in the absence of a living tax (τliv = 0) and of imputed rent tax (τHI = 0), the tax on rents can and
must be compensated by a differential tax on land such that
∆τL =
τH
RHgrossh′l
– In particular, the landlord occupying its land must be taxed at a higher rate than the landlord
renting its land to tenants, to restore the intra-period allocation of income of tenants and landlords.
– Again, in the absence of a tax on rents, the first best is reached with a non-differentiated tax on
land:
∆τL = 0
which does not exclude a tax on land itself. See infra.
• In the absence of a differential tax on land (∆τL = 0), the tax on rent could potentially be compensated
by a negative living tax (that is, a subsidy) on landlords implicit rents, but this is not possible with a
positive tax and in any event, this would distort the choice of structures S - see below.
B.4.3 Optimal tax product of land
In the first best described above, one can now calculate the optimal tax levied on land to reach the social
optimum desired by the social planner. We study the case with τI = τK = τS = τliv = τH = 0 , one has that
s, S,K reach their first best level.
We assume here separable utility functions and identical utility functions. To insure u
′
c
U ′C
= γ, the social
planner must then fix an optimal level of transfers using the tax τL:
c+ hRHgross = f(K)−Kf ′(K) + τLL¯ (B.47)
C − hRHgross = Kf ′(K)− δK − δS(s+ S)− τLL¯ (B.48)
with β−1 = RKgross = f ′(K) + 1− δ thus K(δ, β). In all cases:
c+ C = f(K)− δK − δS(s+ S)
In the case γ = 1, the consumption are equalized, leading to:
c = C =
f(K)− δK − δS(s+ S)
2
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and, by difference of the two resource constraints (B.47) and (B.48):
2hRHgross = f(K)− 2Kf ′(K) + δK + δS(s+ S) + 2τL¯L¯
or
τL¯L¯ = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)−
1
2
[f(K) + δK + δS(s+ S)] (B.49)
which is equation (31) in the text, In the general case with positive γ and CARA utility function, if lnu(c) =
−νc and lnU(C) = −νC, therefore:
c− C = − ln γ
ν
In that case, by difference of the resource constraints, for separable utility functions, identical and exponential
negative functions (CARA) in the general case γ ≤ 1:
τL¯L¯ = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)−
1
2
[
f(K) + δK + δS(s+ S)− ln γ
2ν
]
(B.50)
which is equation (32) in the text. The product of the land tax must grow as γ (share of the capitalist) goes
down.
Still in the general case of γ ≤ 1, equation (33) in the text is obtained in the case of CRRA sub-utility
functions U(C) = 11−σC
(1−σ). At the first best, γU ′(C) = γC−σ = c−σ. Indeed, we have γ C
−σ
c−σ = 1. or
C
c
=
1
γ
σ
Then
c+ C = c(1 +
C
c
) = c
[
(1 +
(
1
γ
)σ]
(B.51)
Now, summing up equations (B.47) and (B.48), one obtains
c+ C = f(K)− δK − δS(s+ S) (B.52)
Using (B.51) and (B.52) one gets,
c =
f(K)− δK − δS(s+ S)
1 +
(
1
γ
)σ (B.53)
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Now using equation (B.48), one obtains
τLL = hRHgross +Kf ′(K)− f(K) + c (B.54)
Replacing c by its expression in (B.53) in (B.54) one obtains the result in equation (33) in the text.
B.4.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
On the suboptimal invetment in s.
Let us defined as in the Proposition s = sl the structure quantity per unit of land. The rent tax including
imputed rent entails a new equilibrium with underprovision of s with respect to the first best. Introducing a
small tax τH , the new equilibrium must respect the Euler equation with respect to tenant structure equation
(39) is defined by:
β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)RHGrossh′s(s, l)
Using the constant return to scale property of the function h such that leads to h(s, l) = lg(s) where g(s) is
an increasing concave function of land per structure. The Euler equation with respect to tenant structure now
writes
β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)RHGrossg′(s)
Fully differentiating it and rearranging leads to
ds
dτH
=
g′
(
1− (1− τH) dRHGrossdτHRHGross
)
(1− τH)RHGrossg′′ (B.55)
The denominator of the RHS of (B.55) is negative given the concavity of g. Now we can prove that the
numerator is positive. Because the housing market is competitive, it is a standard result that we we have full
shifting of the tax, that is dRHGross − dRHnet = dτHRHGross or
dRHGross
dτHRHGross
< 1
implying that the numerator of (B.55) is positive. It follows that dsdτH < 0.
On the suboptimal investment in S. τH τHI
Similarly, denote by S = SL the capitalist-structure quantity per unit of land. We further assume that
the housing production function is Cobb-Douglas. With the rent tax profiles including imputed rents tax
considered in Proposition 2.2,
τHI = τH
h′l
H ′L
(B.56)
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Therefore condition (35 becomes
U ′H
U ′C
=
u′hh
′
l
u′cH ′L
= RHGross
h′l
H ′L
(B.57)
We show that a new equilibrium is reached with underprovision of S with respect to the first best. Introducing
a small tax τHI , the new equilibrium must respect equation (38) rewritten here for convenience:
β−1 = 1− δs +H ′S
(
U ′H
U ′C
− τHIRHGross
)
(B.58)
Combining equations (B.56) and (B.57) into (B.58) we obtain
β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)RHGrossH ′S
h′l
H ′L
(B.59)
As in the previous proof on s, using that H is constant return to scale leads to rewrite equation (B.58) as
β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)RHGrossG′S
h′l
H ′L
(B.60)
with H(S,L) = LG(S)
and G(S) is a concave function. Under the assumption that both h and H are Cobb-Douglas with the same
elasticity ν, h(s, l) = lνs(1−ν) = lg(s) and H(S,L) = LG(S) with g(x) = G(x) = x1−ν , one has then
h′l = ν(s/l)
1−ν = νs1−ν
H ′L = ν(S/L)1−ν = νS1−ν
G′ = (1− ν)S−ν
Using these expressions in (B.59) leads to
β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)RHGross(1− ν)s
1−ν
S
(B.61)
Fully differentiate (B.61) gives after a few steps, one has
−RHGrosssdτH + (1− τH)sdRHGross − (1− τH)RHGross s
S
dS + (1− τH)(1− ν)RHGrossds=0
and then finally
dS
dτH
= −
S
(
1− (1− τH) dRHGrossdτHRHGross
)
(1− τH)RHGross + (1− ν)
S
s
ds
dτH
(B.62)
We already know that the first term of the RHS of (B.62) is negative as well as that the second term is negative
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(see the proofs for the underprovivsion of s). Hence,
dS
dτH
< 0

B.4.5 Optimal taxation/subventions of structures
Still without living tax, comparisons of the decentralized equilibrium Euler equations on structures, equations
(B.43) and (B.44) to the social planner counterparts (B.31) and (B.32), one obtains the optimal value of the
tax/subsidy on S when
τS = 0
The equivalent result on the structures of tenants s financed by landlords, the optimal value of the tax/subsidy
on s is reached when
τH = −τs (B.63)
that is, when a subsidy on investment in structures exactly compensate for the tax on rents.
B.4.6 Living tax with no other tax
To be exhaustive, one adds a discussion of the living tax in the particular case in which the tax on imputed
rents is removed: τHI = 0. In that case, the decentralized system becomes:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1
1 + τliv,t
+
τliv
1 + τliv,t
H ′L
h′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(B.64)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
− τlivRHgrossH ′S (B.65)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + 1
1 + τliv
u′hh
′
s
u′c
(B.66)
It is easy to show that the living tax is distortive on S and reduces its return. It is also easy to see from
equation (B.66) that the living tax reduces the returns on investment in s. In both cases, both marginal
rates of substitution U
′
HH
′
S
U ′C
and u
′
hh
′
s
u′c
must increase. Last, from equation (B.64), a positive living tax increases
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
/
u′c
U ′C
relative to the first best.
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C Extension with demographic weights
In this Appendix, we verify that the first order conditions in the decentralized equilibrium and of the Pareto-
optimum are independent of the assumption of a unique representative capitalist. We assume that there is a
mass m of capitalists and keep as a normalization a mass 1 of workers. Only the resource condition will have
m as an parameter, that shifts the consumption and income of capitalists.
The program of the capitalist is, using Ct, Ht for its per capita consumption, as well as St, st,Kt for
the structures and capital stock per capitalist. To get the aggregates, one simply multiply by m and chose
notations K,S, s, L for respectively the aggregate stocks K = Km;S = Sm,s = sm, L = mL. For the stock
of structures for tenants, the total stock s is divided by the mass of tenants that is 1. Similarly, the land
consumed by tenants is l = L¯ − L where L¯ is the total stock of land. Finally, the returns on housing must be
divided by m since capitalists share the product.
C.1 Decentralized program with demographic weight
The total marginal product of one additional unit of capital Kt is f ′(Kt). The amount invested is therefore
m times the marginal amount of indivudial capital; that amount is split in each of the capitalists, so each
capitalist receives for its marginal investment in Kt
mf ′(Kt)/m = f ′(Kt)
and pays for its own individual depreciation. It follows that one can define the gross return to capital as:
RKgrosst = f
′(Ktm) + 1− δ
and
RKnett = [f
′(Ktm) + 1− δ] (1− τK,t)
The program of the capitalist is:
max
Ct,Ht,Lt,Kt+1,st+1,St+1
∑
t
βt {U [Ct, H (Lt, St)]}
+βtλKt
{
RKnett (mKt) + τI,t(1− δ)Kt +RHgrosst (1− τH,t)ht(L¯ −mLt,mst)/m
−(τliv,t + τHI,t)RHgrosst Ht(Lt, St)
+(1− δS)(1 + τSt)St + (1− δs)(1 + τst)st − TLt
−Ct − St+1(1 + τSt)− st+1(1 + τst)−Kt+1(1 + τI,t)}
subject to subject to βtU ′C(t)Mt+1 → 0, for Mt = Kt, St, st. Simply note that here, one needs to account for
the fact that aggregate returns to capital depend on the total aggregate stock.
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The program of the worker is still:
max
ct,ht
u (ct, ht)
subject to ct + htR
Hgross
t (1 + τliv,t) = wt + Tt
where the combinations entering the rental housing service ht = (l∗t , s
∗
t ) will be chosen at the equilibrium by
landlords.
We have, denoting by λwt the multiplier of the constraint of the worker, and λKt the multiplier of the
constraint of the capitalist, and ∆τL,t = τL,t − τl,t:
Worker: intraperiod
∂ct u
′
c = λ
w
t (C.1)
∂ht u
′
h(t) = λ
w
t R
Hgross
t (t)(1 + τliv,t) (C.2)
⇔ u′h(t) = u′cRHgrosst (1 + τliv,t) (C.3)
Capitalist: intraperiod
∂Ct U
′
C(t) = λ
K
t (C.4)
∂Lt U ′HH ′L(t) = λKt
(
Rgrosst (1− τH,t)h′l(t) + ∆τL + (τliv,t + τHI,t)RHgrosst H ′L(t)
)
(C.5)
Capitalist: intertemporal (Euler)
∂St+1 λ
K
t (1 + τSt) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δS)(1 + τSt) + βU ′HH ′S(t+ 1)
− β(τliv,t+1 + τHI,t+1)RHgrosst+1 H ′S(t+ 1) (C.6)
∂st+1 λ
K
t (1 + τst) = βλ
K
t+1(1− δs)(1 + τst) + βλKt+1RHgrosst+1 (1− τH,t+1)h′s(t+ 1) (C.7)
∂Kt+1 λ
K
t (1 + τI,t+1) = βλ
K
t+1
[
RKnett+1 +(1− δ)τI,t+1
]
(C.8)
58
or in the steady-state,
Worker: intraperiod
u′h = u
′
cR
Hgross(1 + τliv) (C.9)
Capitalist: intraperiod
∂Ct U
′
C = λ
K (C.10)
∂Lt U ′HH ′L = U ′C
(
RHgross(1− τH)h′l + ∆τL + (τliv + τHI)RHgrossH ′L
)
(C.11)
Capitalist: intertemporal (Euler)
∂S U ′C(1 + τS) = βU
′
C(1− δS)(1 + τS) + βU ′HH ′S
− β(τliv + τHI)RHgrossH ′S (C.12)
∂s U ′C(1 + τs) = βU
′
C(1− δs)(1 + τs) + βU ′CRHgross(1− τH)h′s (C.13)
∂K (1 + τI) = β
[
RKnet+(1− δ)τI
]
(C.14)
Re-arranging the terms, using in particular RHnet = (1− τH)u
′
h
u′c
(1 + τliv)
−1, one obtains:
Intraperiod allocations
u′hh
′
l
U ′HH
′
L
(
1− τH
1 + τliv
+
τliv+τHI
1 + τliv
H ′L
h′l
+
∆τL
(1 + τliv)RHgrossh′l
)
=
u′c
U ′C
(C.15)
Intertemporal allocations (Euler)
∂S β−1 = 1− δS + 1
1 + τS
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
− (τliv + τHI)RHgrossH ′S (C.16)
∂s β−1 = 1− δs + (1− τH)
1 + τs
1
1 + τliv
u′hh
′
s
u′c
(C.17)
∂K β−1 =
RKgross(1− τK) + (1− δ)τI
1 + τI
(C.18)
C.2 Social planner with demographic weights
The system can be compared to the social planner’s allocation. Its program is now:
max
Ct,ct,St+1,st+1,Lt,Kt+1
∑
t
βt
{
u
[
ct, h
(
L¯ −mLt,mst
)]
+mγU [Ct, H (Lt, St)]
}
+βtλt {f(mKt) + (1− δ)mKt + (1− δS)m(St + st)
−ct −mCt −mSt+1 −mst+1 −mKt+1}
subject to three transversality conditions on each stock:
βtU ′C(t)Mt+1 → 0 (C.19)
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for Mt = Kt, St, st. Again, to avoid multiple indices, we add the time period when relevant in parenthesis,
e.g. RKgross(t+ 1) is the gross return to capital producing returns next period and defined as:
mRKgross(t+ 1) = mf ′(mKt+1) +m(1− δ)
We then obtain the first order conditions for each period:
∂Ct mλt = γmU
′
C(t) (C.20)
∂ct λt = u
′
c(t) (C.21)
∂Lt mγU ′HH ′L(t) = mu′hh′l(t) (C.22)
∂St+1 mλt = mβλt+1(1− δS) +mγβU ′HH ′S(t+ 1) (C.23)
∂st+1 mλt = mβλt+1(1− δS) +mβu′hh′s(t+ 1) (C.24)
∂Kt+1 mλt = mβλt+1R
Kgross(t+ 1) (C.25)
This notably implies the following steady-state relations, m disappears and one is left with:
∂Ct, ct λ = γU
′
C = u
′
c (C.26)
∂Lt γU ′HH ′L = u′hh′l (C.27)
Euler St+1 β
−1 =
U ′HH
′
S
U ′C
+ 1− δS (C.28)
Euler st+1 β
−1 =
u′hh
′
S
u′c
+ 1− δS (C.29)
Euler Kt+1 β
−1 = RKgross = f ′(K) + 1− δ (C.30)
D Appendix: Proofs of propositions of the second best analysis
D.1 Without housing
For the sake of the completeness of the proof, we restate the optimization problem.
max
ct,Ct,Kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βt(u(ct) + γmU(Ct))
f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt − ct −mCt −Kt+1 = 0 ;multiplier λt
βU ′(Ct+1)(mCt+1 +Kt+2)− U ′(Ct)Kt+1 = 0 ;multiplier µt (D.1)
K0 given
βtU ′(Ct)Kt+1 → 0 transversality condition
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where the constraint of the capitalist has been introduced in the Euler equation. The first order conditions
are:
βtu′(ct) = βtλt (D.2)
mγU ′(Ct) + µt−1U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1) +mU ′(Ct)) = mλt + µtU ′′(Ct)Kt+1 (D.3)
βt+1λt+1(f
′(Kt+1) + (1− δ)) + βtµt−1U ′(Ct) = βtµtU ′(Ct) + βtλt (D.4)
Proof of Lemma 2, Section 4.6.2: Suppose quantities converge to an interior steady state. Then the
multiplier µt converges to µ =
γ(1−γ˜c)
γ˜c(1−σC) and is positive iff (1 − γ˜c)(1 − σC) > 0. More specifically, if γ˜c < 1
then the convergence of multipliers to a positive number requires σC < 1. Proof: We deduce from (D.2)
u′(ct) = λt
Then (D.3) becomes
mγU ′(Ct)−mu′(ct) + µt−1U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1) +mU ′(Ct)) = µtU ′′(Ct)Kt+1 (D.5)
or dividing by U ′′(Ct)Kt+1
µt = µt−1(
mCt +Kt+1
Kt+1
+
mU ′(Ct)
U ′′(Ct)Kt+1
) +
mγU ′(Ct)
U ′′(Ct)Kt+1
− mu
′(ct)
U ′′(Ct)Kt+1
Using the power specification of the utility function,
U(C) =
C1−σC
1− σC
implying
σC = −U
”(C)
U ′(C)
C
we obtain after trivial steps
µt − µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
]
(D.6)
Consider (D.6) when µt − µt−1 = 0 at the limit. We check that the multiplier is positive. Starting from
µ(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(c)
U ′(C)
= 0
with µ being the limit of µt in infinity and defining
γU ′(C)
u′(c)
= γ˜c
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we finally obtain
µ =
γ(1− γ˜c)
γ˜c(1− σCC) > 0 (D.7)

D.2 With housing and a rent tax
The Ramsey problem we consider is the following:
max
ct,Ct,Kt+1,Ht,τH,t
∞∑
t=0
βt(uc(ct) + uh(H¯ −Ht) + γm(UC(Ct) + UH(Ht))
such that:
f(Kt) + (1− δ)Kt − ct −mCt −Kt+1 = 0 multiplier λt ≥ 0 (D.8)
βU ′C(Ct+1)(mCt+1 +Kt+2 −RHgrosst+1 (1− τH,t+1)(H −mHt+1))− U ′C(Ct)Kt+1 = 0 multiplier µt (D.9)
RHgrosst u
′
c(ct)− u′h(H −mHt) = 0, multiplier η1t (D.10)
RHgrosst (1− τH,t)U ′C(Ct)− U ′H(Ht) = 0, multiplier η2t (D.11)
τH,t ≥ 0, multiplier φt ≥ 0 (D.12)
βtU ′C(Ct)Kt+1 → 0 (D.13)
K0 given
In the program, we have inserted from the start the budget constraint of the capitalist in the Euler equation.
The Walras Law implies that we can omit to write down the budget constraint of the worker. In the following
we make a small abuse of notations in omitting the subscripts for the subutility of consumption and housing
both for the worker and capitalist. The FOCs are:
• With respect to ct
βtu′(ct) + βtη1tR
Hgross
t u
′′(ct) = βtλt
or
λt = u
′(ct) + η1tR
Hgross
t u
′′(ct) (D.14)
With respect to Ct
βtmγU ′(Ct) + βtµt−1(U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1 −RHnett (H −mHt)) +mU ′(Ct)) + βtη2tU
′′
(Ct)R
Hnet
t
= βtmλt + β
tµtU
′′(Ct)Kt+1
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or
mγU ′(Ct) + µt−1(U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1 −RHnett (H −mHt)) +mU ′(Ct)) + η2tU
′′
(Ct)R
Hnet
t (D.15)
= mλt + µtU
′′(Ct)Kt+1
• With respect to Kt+1
βt+1λt+1(f
′(Kt+1) + (1− δ)) + βtµt−1U ′(Ct) = βtµtU ′(Ct) + βtλt (D.16)
• With respect to Ht
βt(−mu′(H−mHt) +mγU ′(Ht)) +mβttµt−1βU ′(Ct)(RHnett ) +mβtη1tu′′(H−mHt)−βtη2tU ′′(Ht) = 0
or
−mu′(H −mHt) +mγU ′(Ht)) +mµt−1βU ′(Ct)(RHnett ) +mη1tu′′(H −mHt)− η2tU ′′(Ht) = 0 (D.17)
• With respect to τH,t
βt(U ′(Ct)R
Hgross
t (H −mHt)µt−1 − βtRHgrosst U ′(Ct)η2t + φ = 0
or
(H −mHt)µt−1 − η2t + φ = 0 (D.18)
• with in addition, the usual Kuhn and Tucker condition.
φtτH,t = 0
Proof of Proposition 5 (Optimal capital tax in the Ramsey problem with housing), Section
4.6.3: Assume that the following instruments are available to the decision maker, tax on capital, lump sum
benefit to workers, tax on rents. Consider an economy where the preferences of both the capitalist and workers
are separable, with a CCRA sub-additive utility of consumption. Suppose that quantities converges to an
interior steady state and that σC < 1, γ˜c < 1 and γ˜h < 1. Then the optimal tax on capital is 0 and the optimal
tax on rents is positive in the limit. Consequently the stock of capital in the second best remains equal to the
stock of capital in the first best.
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Proof: The proof consists of exhibiting sufficient conditions for the Euler equation multiplier to be still
positive. We express the other multipliers in terms of the Euler equation multiplier. The proof is in three steps.
Step 1: Expression of other multipliers in function of the Euler multiplier If a rental tax
is second-best optimal for any t, then φt = 0. Then from (D.18)
η2t = (H¯ −mHt)µt−1 (D.19)
If quantities and µt converge, then η2t converges. Plugging (D.19) in (D.17) gives −mu′(H − mHt) +
mγU ′(Ht))+mµt−1βU ′(Ct)(RHnett )+mη1tu
′′(H−mHt)−(H−mHt)µt−1U ′′(Ht) = 0 or −mη1tu′′(H−Ht) =
−mu′(H −mHt) +mγU ′(Ht) + µt−1(mRHnett U ′(Ct)− (H −mHt)U ′′(Ht))
η1t =
−mu′(ht) +mγU ′(Ht) + µt−1(mRHnett U ′(Ct)− htU ′′(Ht))
−mu′′(ht)
Using (D.11) we get
η1t =
−mu′(ht) +mγU ′(Ht) + µt(mU ′(Ht)− htU ′′(Ht))
−mu′′(ht)
Factorising U ′((Ht) and defining
γU ′(Ht))
u′(ht)
= γ˜h (D.20)
η1t = U
′(Ht)
−γmγ˜h + γm+ µt−1
(
m− ht U
′′(Ht)
U ′(Ht)
)
−mu′′(ht)
Finally denoting σH(Ht) = −Ht U
′′(Ht)
U ′(Ht)
> 0 we get
η1t =
U ′(Ht)
−mu′′(ht)
[
−γm
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h) + µt−1
(
m+
ht
Ht
σH(Ht)
)]
(D.21)
If quantities and µt converge, then η1t converges. From (D.14) we deduce that if η1t converges, then λt
converges.
Step 2 Expression of the Euler multiplier µt. Now we look at equation (D.15)
mγU ′(Ct) + µt−1(U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1 −RHnett (H −mHt)) +mU ′(Ct)) + η2tU
′′
(Ct)R
Hnet
t
= mλt + µtU
′′(Ct)Kt+1
Using the expression (D.14) for λt and the expression (D.19) for η2t , the above expression becomes
mγU ′(Ct) + µt−1(U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1 −RHnett ht) +mU ′(Ct)) + µt−1U
′′
(Ct)R
Hnet
t ht
= mu′(ct) + µtU ′′(Ct)Kt+1 +mη1t R
Hgross
t u
′′(ct)
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Since two terms vanish, we can write
mγU ′(Ct)−mu′(ct) + µt−1(U ′′(Ct)(mCt +Kt+1) +mU ′(Ct))−mη1t RHgrosst u′′(ct)
= µtU
′′(Ct)Kt+1
Dividing by U ′′(Ct)Kt+1 and noticing that only the last term of the LHS is different from the expression
obtained without housing (see D.5) one gets using (D.6)
µt − µt−1 = mCt
Kt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
]
− mη1tR
Hgross
t u
′′(ct)
U ′′(Ct)Kt+1
Now replacing η1t by its expression in (D.21)
µt−µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
]
−R
Hgross
t u
′′(ct)U ′(Ht)
U ′′(Ct)Kt+1u′′(ht)
[
γm
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
m+
ht
Ht
σH(Ht)
)]
or
µt − µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
]
− R
Hgross
t u
′′(ct)U ′(Ht)
Kt+1u′′(ht)
CtU
′(Ct)
CtU ′′(Ct)U ′(Ct)
[
γm
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH(Ht)
)]
In case of an isoelastic utility function on consumption, one gets introducing σC
µt − µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
]
+
CtR
Hgross
t u
′′(ct)U ′(Ht)
σCKt+1u′′(ht)U ′(Ct)
[
γm
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
m+
ht
Ht
σH(Ht)
)]
Putting mCtσCKt+1 in factor and using (D.10)
µt−µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
+
u′(ht)u′′(ct)U ′(Ht)
u′′(ht)u′(ct)U ′(Ct)
(
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH(Ht)
))]
Introducing σc and σh(ht) = −ht U
′′(ht)
U ′(ht)
µt−µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
(µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
+
σchtU
′(Ht)
σh(ht)ctU ′(Ct)
(
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH(Ht)
))]
And using (D.11)
µt − µt−1 = mCt
σCKt+1
[
µt−1(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(ct)
U ′(Ct)
+
σchtR
Hnet
σh(ht)ct
(
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µt−1
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH(Ht)
))]
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Consider an interior steady state. If the multipliers converge, at the limit µt+1 − µt = 0. We are looking at
the value of the limit value of the multiplier µ and we establish at which sufficient conditions it is positive
µ(σC − 1)− γ + u
′(c)
U ′(C)
+
σchR
Hnet
σhc
[
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µ
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH
)]
= 0
or
µ(σC − 1)− γ γ˜c − 1
γ˜c
+
σchR
Hnet
σhc
[
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h)− µ
(
1 +
ht
mHt
σH
)]
= 0
γ
1− γ˜c
γ˜c
+
σchR
Hnet
σhc
γ
γ˜h
(1− γ˜h) = µ
[
1− σC + σchR
Hnet
σhc
(
1 +
h
mH
σH
)]
µ = γ
1−γ˜c
γ˜c
+ σchR
Hnet
σhc
1−γ˜h
γ˜h
1− σC + σc
(
hRHnet
c
(
1
σh
+ hmH
σH
σh
)) (D.22)
or in the case where σC = σc
µ = γ
1−γ˜C
γ˜C
+ σChR
Hnet
σhc
1−γ˜h
γ˜h
1− σC + σC
(
hRHnet
c
(
1
σh
+ hmH
σH
σh
)) (D.23)
We can then state the following lemma.
Appendix Lemma A-1. Consider separable preferences conditions with CCRA subadditive utility of
consumption. Suppose that there exists an interior steady state, K, c, C, h,H > 0. Assume σC = σc < 1,
γ˜c < 1 and γ˜h < 1. Then the multipliers µt converge to a positive value.
Step 3 Dynamic accumulation of capital at the steady state Now we move to equation (D.16)
βt+1λt+1(f
′(Kt+1) + (1− δ)) + βtµt−1U ′(Ct) = βtµtU ′(Ct) + βtλt
which becomes λt+1λt (f
′(Kt+1) + (1 − δ)) = 1β + (µt−µt−1)βλt U ′(Ct) If there is an interior steady state, we have
shown that the multipliers µt converge with the stated conditions and step 1 shows that if µt converges, then
λt also converges. We deduce that f ′(Kt+1) + (1− δ)) = 1β and then RKgross = 1β .
The Euler equation of the capitalist at the steady state implies that τK = 0 and then the stock of capital
remains the same as in the first best. Making stock of the all previous steps, we can state Proposition 6 in the
text. .
Proof of Proposition 6 in the paper, Section 4.6.3: Under the assumptions stated in Lemma 1, the
optimal rental tax at the steady state is given by
τH
1− τH =
1− γ˜c
s
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where s the elasticity of the rental housing supply with respect to the net rent, being computed at the housing
equilibrium.
Proof: We consider the stationnary state where capital and wage rate are at their first best values by
virtue of Proposition 4. Let us denote them respectively K∗ and w∗. The Ramsey problem we have to solved
is simpler than the original one given by conditions (D.8) to (D.11), since we do not have any more to consider
explicitly condition (D.9), the Euler equation. The separability utility is specifically helpful here because
the marginal utility of consumption of the capitalist does not depend on his consumption of housing. The
conditions (D.10) and (D.11) still hold and it is therefore useful to express the problem using the indirect
utilities functions of the capitalist and the worker. Let us denote them respectively V (τH) and v(τH). At the
steady state, the decision maker maximizes the weighted sum of indirect utility functions
MaxτH ,0<τH<1,TW = v(w
∗ + TH −RHgross(τH)h, h)+
γmV
(
1− β
β
K
m
∗
+ (1− τH)RHgross(τH)(H/m−H), H
)
under the budget constraint
TH = τHR
Hgross(τH)h(R
Hgross(τH)), multiplier λ
It is somewhat simpler to work with the ad valorem tax τ˜H and the net-of-tax rent RHnet
RHnet(1 + τ˜H) = R
Hgross
than to work with τH defined by
RHnet = RHgross(1− τH)
The two tax rates are related by
τ˜H =
τH
1− τH (D.24)
We define the elasticity of the rental supply with respect to to the net-of-tax rent RHnet
s =
(H −mH)′RHnet
(H −mH)R′Hnet
or with h(RHnet) = H −mH(RHnet) = m
(
H
m −H
)
s =
h′(RHnet)RHnet
h(RHnet)R′Hnet
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Now the objective function reads
W (TH , τ˜H) = v(w
∗ + TH −RHnet(1 + τ˜H)h, h) + γmV
(
1− β
β
K
m
∗
+RHnet
h(RHnet)
m
,H
)
under the resource constraint
TH = τ˜HR
Hnet(τ˜H)h(R
Hnet(τ˜H))
Using the envelope theorem, the FOCs with respect to T and τ˜H are:
v′c(.) = λ
v′c(.)(−RHneth− (1 + τ˜H)R′Hneth) + γmV ′C .(.)(R′Hnet
h
m
) + λ(RHneth+ τ˜H(R
′Hneth+RHneth′R′Hnet)) = 0
Eliminating λ and regrouping terms we obtain
v′c(.)(−(1 + τ˜H)R′Hneth+ τ˜H(R′Hneth+RHneth′R′Hnet) + γV ′C .(.)(R′Hneth) = 0
Dividing by v′c(.) and using the definition of γ˜c
−(1 + τ˜H)R′Hneth+ τ˜H(R′Hneth+RHneth′R′Hnet) + γ˜c(R′Hneth) = 0
Dividing by R′Hneth we obtain
−1− τ˜H + τ˜H(1 + s)) + γ˜c = 0
or
τ˜H =
1− γ˜c
s
and using (D.24) we get
τH
1− τH =
1− γ˜c
s

Proof of Corollary, Section 4.6.3
We consider the particular case of Cobb-Douglas preferences: U(c, h) = φ log h+ (1− φ) log c. The steady
state situation is characterized by a capital level, a wage level and a return on capital that are denoted with
an asterix (∗), and which are identical to that of the first best since the tax on capital is zero. There are three
unkwowns, RHnet, τ˜H , T and three equations
The equilibrium condition on the housing market at the aggregate level
hd(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) = hs(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) (D.25)
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The state budget balance
TH = hRHnetτ˜H (D.26)
The second-best optimal tax on rents
τ˜H =
1
s
(1− γ˜c) (D.27)
We also use
γU ′(C)
u′(c)
= γ˜c
c
C
(D.28)
Step 1: computing the supply elasticity of renting housing.
The supply elasticity of renting housing is not constant. Starting from the equation of equilibrium on the
market for the optimal tax τ˜H where hs is the supply at the macro level
hd(R
Hgross) = hs(R
Hnet)
Differentiating this expression
h′d(R
Hgross)dRHgross = h′s(R
Hnet)dRnet
Since RHgross = RHnet(1 + τ˜H) then dRHgross = dRHnet(1 + τ˜H) dividing by dRHgross we get
h′d(R
Gross) = h′s(R
Hnet)
1
1 + τ˜H
Now multipliying by RGross
h′d(R
Gross)RHgross = h′s(R
Hnet)RHnet
And finally dividing by hd
h′d(R
Gross)RHgross
hd
=
h′s(R
Hnet)
hs
We conclude that at the equilibrium
s = −d
and we know the price elasticity of the demand of housing with a Cobb-Douglas which is −1. Then,
s = 1 (D.29)
Step 2: Computing the tax formula.
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We deduce from (D.27), (D.28), and (D.29) that
τ˜H = 1− γ c
C
(D.30)
We also need the demands of the composite consumption good
c = (1− φ)(w∗ + TH)
mC = (1− φ)(A∗ +RHnetH)
with ( 1−ββ )K
∗ = A∗ and therefore
c
C
=
m(w∗ + TH)
A∗ +RHnetH
which allows to offer another expression for τ˜H .
τ˜H = 1− γ m(w
∗ + TH)
A∗ +RHnetH
(D.31)
Step 3: Expression of the equilibrium rent RHnet.
We also need the expressions of the housing demands
hd(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) =
φ(w∗ + TH)
RHgross
=
φ(w∗ + TH)
RHnet(1 + τ˜H)
(D.32)
mH(RHnet, TH , τ˜H) =
φ(A∗ +RHnetH)
RHnet
(D.33)
The macro supply of renting housing
hs(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) = H −mH(RHnet, TH , τ˜H) = H − φ((A
∗+RHnetH)
RHnet
= R
HnetH−φA∗−φRHnetH
RHnet
=
hs(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) =
−φA∗ + (1− φ)RHnetH
RHnet
(D.34)
hs(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) > 0
if and only if
−φA∗ + (1− φ)RHnetH > 0
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hs(R
Hnet, TH , τ˜H) > 0 iff RHnet >
φ
1− φ
A∗
H
(D.35)
Starting from hd = hs and using (D.32) and (D.34) we get
φ(w∗ + TH)
RHnet(1 + τ˜H)
=
−φA∗ + (1− φ)RHnetH
RHnet
or
φ(w∗ + TH) = −φA∗(1 + τ˜H) + (1− φ)(1 + τ˜H)RHnetH
which leads to an expression of the equilibrium rent in function of TH and τ˜H
RHnet =
φ
[
(w∗ + TH) +A∗(1 + τ˜H)
]
H(1− φ)(1 + τ˜H)
=
φ(w∗ + TH)
H(1− φ))(1 + τ˜H)
+
φ
1− φ
A∗
H
>
φ
1− φ
A∗
H
(D.36)
and then the condition for a positive supply of renting housing (D.35) is satisfied.
Now we need to compute RHnetH
RHnetH =
φ
1− φ
(w∗ + TH) +A∗(1 + τ˜H)
1 + τ˜H
=
φ
1− φ
[
w∗ + TH
1 + τ˜H
+A∗
]
(D.37)
It is interesting to note that the value of land rents in this economy does not depend on the housing land stock
H. This is so because the price-elasticity of housing demand is unitary.
Using in (D.31)
τ˜H = 1− γ m(w
∗ + TH)
A∗ +RHnetH
we obtain
τ˜H = 1− γm (1− φ)(w
∗ + TH)
A∗ + φ(w
∗+TH)
1+τ˜H
(D.38)
Step 4: Elimination of T .
From the (D.26) and using the demand of housing of the worker (D.32) we get
TH =
φ(w∗ + TH)
1 + τ˜H
τ˜H (D.39)
TH(1 + τ˜H) = φ(w
∗ + TH)τ˜H
TH(1 + τ˜H)− φT τ˜H = φw∗τ˜H
TH(1 + τ˜H − φτ˜H) = φw∗τ˜H
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TH = φw∗
τ˜H
1 + τ˜H(1− φ) (D.40)
Other expressions are also useful
φ(w∗ + TH)
1 + τ˜H
=
TH
τ˜H
(D.41)
and
w∗ + TH
TH
=
1 + τ˜H
φτ˜H
(D.42)
Dividing both numerator and denominator and then using (D.41), (D.42) and (D.40) we get
τ˜H = 1− γm
(1−φ)(w∗+TH)
TH
φ(w∗+TH)
1+τ˜H
1
TH
+ A
∗
TH
and after a few steps, τ˜H is the root of the equation of second degree
τ˜H = 1− γm1− φ
φ
1 + τ˜H
1 + A
∗
φw∗ + τ˜H
1−φ
φ
A∗
w∗
(D.43)
Claim 1. There is a unique second best optimal tax rate strictly between 0 and 1 (except for the Rawlsian
case where it is 1) which is the root of the second degree equation (D.43). The tax rate is decreasing with the
social welfare weight γ of the capitalist.
Proof:
It involves a few steps.
Fact 1:
For γ = 0, τ˜H∗ = 1
τ˜H
∗ = 1 then implies that τ∗H = 1/2
Fact 2:
dτ˜H
∗
dγ
< 0
Indeed, we can write (D.43)
Ψ(τ˜H) = τ˜H + f(τ˜H)− 1 = 0
with
f(τ˜H) = γm
1− φ
φ
1 + τ˜H
1 + A
∗
φw∗ + τ˜H
1−φ
φ
A∗
w∗
> 0
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Ψ′(t) = 1 + f ′(τ˜H)
f ′(τ˜H) is of the sign of [1 + A
∗
φw∗ + t
1−φ
φ
A∗
w∗ ]− (1 + τ˜H) (1−φ)φ A
∗
w∗ = 1 +
A∗
φw∗ − (1−φ)φ A
∗
w∗ = 1 +
A∗
w∗ > 0
Ψ′(γ) > 0
Then dτ˜H
∗
dγ = − Ψ
′(γ)
Ψ′(τ˜H)
< 0
Fact 3. Except the Rawlsian case, τ˜H∗ = 1 cannot be solution. 1 + f(1)− 1 > 0
Fact 4. Let us take the utilitarian case which gives the lowest tax by fact 2. τ˜H∗ = 0 cannot be solution
because f(0) − 1 < 0 or f(0) = m 1−φφ 11+ A∗
φw∗
< 1. Indeed, 1−φφ <
1
m (1 +
A∗
φw∗ ),
1
φ − 1 < ( 1φ A
∗
mw∗ +
1
m ) since
A∗
mw∗ > 1 and
1
m > 1.
Fact 5. Ψ(τ˜H) >0. By the theorem of intermediate values, since f is continuous, there is at least a root
between 0 and 1 and since f is increasing there is a unique tax rate which solves the equation. 
Step 5. An explicit formula for the second best optimal tax rate.
τ˜H
∗ =
−(1 + A∗w∗ + γm (1−φ)φ ) + ∆1/2
2[ 1−φφ
A∗
w∗ ]
(D.44)
and ∆ = (1 + A
∗
w∗ + γm
1−φ
φ )
2 − 4 1−φφ A
∗
w∗
[
γm 1−φφ − [1 + A
∗
φw∗ ]
]
> 0
E Additional simulations comparing capital tax to various housing
and land taxes/subsidies
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(a) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0 (b) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0.25
(c) Welfare and tax Product, γ = 0 (d) Welfare and tax Product, γ = 0.25
K-H-s-S economy. Variation in the social welfare function u(c) + γU(C) and the tax revenue in the
decentralized equilibrium, for different values of γ, the social welfare weight (respectively 0 and 1/4).
Comparison between the first best policy (i), a homogeneous tax on land τˆL redistributed to workers
(plain green line with triangles up), or its variant (ii) with a positive tax on rents, a differentiated tax on
land and a subsidy to housing structures of tenants (discontinued green line with stars), and second best
policies: (iii) a tax on rents compensated by a subsidy on residential investments τs < 0 (plain black line
with triangles down), (iv) a tax on rent equal to a tax on imputed rents τH = τHI (plain blue line with
cross), (v) a tax on rents τH alone (discontinued blue line); (vi) a tax on homeowners structures τS > 0
(plain purple line with squares); (vii) a tax on capital equalized to the tax on rents (plain red line); (viii) a
pure tax on capital (dashed red line). Top panels: x-axis is the respective tax rates; bottom panels: x-axis
is is the respective total tax revenue.
Figure D.1: K-H-s-S economy. Variation in the social welfare function with capital taxation
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(a) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0 (b) Welfare and tax rate, γ = 0.25
K-H-s-S economy. Variation in the social welfare function u(c) + γU(C) for different values of γ, the
social welfare weight (respectively 0 and 1/4). Comparison between a tax on capitalist’s structure τS
redistributed to workers, dotted line) and taxes on capital, τK (c, red) and capital and rent, τK = τH (b,
dashed).
Figure D.2: K-H-s-S economy. Variation in the social welfare function : capital Vs. structure taxation
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